TASK FORCE RUSSIA -- 7TH PLENARY SESSION MINUTES 6-8 DECEMBER 1993

Minutes of the Opening Plenary Meeting 7th Plenary Session of the USRJC Moscow, Russia, 6 - 8 December 1993

This session convened at 10 A.M. on 6 December 1993, Il'yinka 10, Moscow.

The session was opened by the Chairman of the American side, Ambassador Malcolm Toon.

Toon: General Volkogonov, we're all happy to be with you again and we look forward to working with you over the next several days. What I plan to do this morning is to make a short statement. In the course of this statement, I hope you'll interrupt me if there are any questions or if you think I've said something wrong.

On behalf of President Clinton and the American people, I would like to express my gratitude to the Russian Side of the Joint Commission for your cooperation. As I stated during our closing plenary in September, your researchers are conducting a thorough preparation for our meetings. You and virtually all of your Russian colleagues have spoken with candor and demonstrated a genuine willingness to be helpful. I believe that I am not exaggerating when I say that few Americans can appreciate as well as I that viewing classified documents in the Soviet Naval Archives and chatting over a friendly lunch with the Acting Director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service are considered normal activities here in Moscow. It was not like this when I was ambassador and I'm glad that's changed.

I felt that the American press was too negative in describing the results of our September meetings. But as you and your fellow Russian citizens already know, a free press is not always accurate. In my recent appearances before the American press, I have tried to correct these inaccuracies, underscoring the important progress we have made together.

My underlying objective this week is to maintain the momentum that we established during our last round of meetings. I and my American colleagues are anxious to hear about the latest discoveries of your working groups on Cold War shootdowns, the Korean War and the Vietnam War. I am also prepared to provide you further information in response to your requests during our last round of meetings. I look forward to the same frank discussions in the coming days that we enjoyed during our April and September meetings earlier this year.

In September, I was glad to hear of your willingness to explore our arguments about Korean War POWs and to work closely with us to research Cold War shootdowns and Vietnam War issues. It was our understanding that between plenary sessions, our working groups would continue to function in order to conduct this follow-up work. I suggested that the American and Russian members of each working group could even convene in Moscow prior to the next plenary session if necessary. Today, I would like to invite the chairmen and deputy chairmen to travel to Washington before our next plenary session in order to consult with their American counterparts. General Volkogonov, if you approve, then I suggest that our two staffs work out the logistical details. In any case, travel for the Russian chairmen and deputy chairmen will be at our expense.

It is essential that an effective mechanism be established to ensure that our joint research continues smoothly between plenary sessions. It seems to me that, despite the important progress we make during our gatherings here, the interaction between our American and Russian researchers dies off as soon as I and my fellow commissioners leave Moscow. Let me be frank with you, General, as I've always been. During the past few months, our researchers at the U.S. Embassy have been concerned by an apparent lack of partners on the Russian Side. Many of their requests remain unanswered. On several occasions, they received responses to their inquiries that, frankly, are difficult to believe, such as "no further information exists in Russian archives on Vietnam War POWs." This means to me that the " 1205" and the "735" documents are the only existing Vietnam documents in Russian archives. This, to me, is incredible.

General, I realize that demands on your time are great. You and your Russian colleagues have been contending with momentous events in recent months. Your jobs are sure to grow even more demanding as Russia's historic transformation continues. But we must continue our close cooperation, even in the face of other very important tasks. President Clinton and Vice President Gore have both told me that they are deeply interested in our work. The Vice President plans to express his strong support for the Joint Commission's efforts when he meets with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin next week, and I plan to brief the President on the outcome of our discussions when I return to Washington. Moreover, President Yeltsin has declared his full support for this Commission. In the spirit of partnership between our two countries, we must develop a way to sustain our joint efforts on a daily basis, General Volkogonov, even when you and I are not directly engaged in the work of the Commission.

I would therefore like to propose that when necessary, the chief of our research team at the American Embassy, Colonel Parr, be permitted to contact the three chairmen of the Russian working groups directly in order to communicate information and ideas which is absolutely critical to the success of our efforts and will not be left behind in this room after we leave.

I would like to congratulate you, General Volkogonov, on your appointment by President Yeltsin as Chairman of the Russian Federation's new commission to investigate foreigners missing in Russia and Russian citizens missing outside the borders of the former Soviet Union. (Or perhaps you'd rather have condolences instead of congratulations?) The formation of this commission, and the selection of you as its head, further underscore the commitment of President Yeltsin's government to the humanitarian principles that underlie the work of the Joint Commission.

I noted from press reports that the membership of this new body will be very similar to that of our Joint Commission and that you do not expect to have a single permanent staffer at your disposal. I anticipate that this will place an even greater burden on your time but ask that this not detract from our joint efforts to resolve the fate of our missing servicemen. This further underscores our urgent need to develop a mechanism for our researchers to communicate with each other during those periods when you will be occupied with other duties between plenary meetings, a mechanism such as I have described.

Our working group chairmen have come to Moscow well prepared. Since September, we have further developed our arguments regarding possible transfers of American servicemen to the Soviet Union during the Korean War. Congressman Johnson, along with Mr. Kauzlarich and their colleagues, hope to explore these ideas with you during the next three days. We also hope to further our investigation of the Philip Mandra case and to lay the groundwork for a possible visit by our researchers to Magadan next spring. During our September meetings, General Volkogonov, you offered to search the special camp archives for information on U.S. pilots and other personnel who could possibly have been interned in the Soviet Union during the Korean War. I anxiously await a report on your findings.

On Cold War shootdowns, I reiterate our conviction that the Naval Archives at Gatchina and the Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense at Podolsk hold the answers to many of our questions. It was my understanding during our very useful meeting in Gatchina in September that such access would be forthcoming. Unfortunately, this has not been the case.

Congressman Peterson is prepared for a detailed discussion on Vietnam War POWs. The Congressman and I were pleased by the frank and open discussions fostered by the Vietnam working group in September. Recently, however, we have been concerned by press reports suggesting that Foreign Minister Kozyrev and the Vietnamese Foreign Minister have agreed that any documents relating to Vietnam will be reviewed by the Vietnamese Government before being released to us. Such an arrangement clearly would not be in accordance with your pledge to provide us with all information uncovered in Russian archives that pertains to American POWs from the Vietnam War. I am sure that you agree that the free flow of archival information is critical to the success of our humanitarian efforts. Now, I understand that I will have a meeting with the Foreign Minister while here in Moscow. If that is the case, then I will raise the question.

While we agree that we should concentrate our efforts on Cold War, Korean War, and Vietnam War

cases, I do not believe that we have fully completed our work on World War II. As I have previously noted within this group, it appears that the Soviet Government probably did its best to repatriate American POWs following World War II. But we will not be able to declare our investigation on this subject officially closed until we receive a written statement from you certifying how many American soldiers were returned through the Soviet Union, how many remained in the Soviet Union, how many died in captivity, and how many remain unaccounted for. We are also awaiting the accounts of Kurile Island veterans regarding the fate of U.S. POWs there during World War II.

I and my colleagues are also prepared to respond to your previous questions regarding missing Russian servicemen. I have worked closely with Director of Central Intelligence Woolsey to clarify the circumstances surrounding the sinking of your GOLF class submarine in March 1968. Mr. Woolsey checked again with our Director of Naval Intelligence regarding the U.S. submarine "Swordfish." While on patrol on March 2, 1968, the USS Swordfish (SSN-579) collided with pack ice. She returned to Yokosuka on March 16 and subsequently entered drydock for repairs. However, on the 11th of March, when the GOLF class submarine sank, the "Swordfish" was over 2,000 miles away from the GOLF's position. I'll be glad to turn over to you this paper, which, I hope, will close the case.

During our last plenary session, you will recall that I asked the Acting Archivist of the United States, Dr. Trudy Peterson, to search the archives of the U.S. Presidential files for any information on this incident. She has discovered several documents, which I will now pass to you.

[Dr. Peterson hands over the documents found on this case.]

We also continue our work on behalf of soldiers from the former Soviet Army still missing in Afghanistan. As I have said repeatedly, our humanitarian mission includes both your POWs and MIAs as well as ours. During every meeting with Afghan government officials and factional leaders, U.S. officials stress that all former Soviet POWs should be released immediately.

On November 9, our Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Robin Raphel met in Kabul with the Afghan President, Prime Minister, and Foreign Minister, as well as former Defense Minister Masood. Prime Minister Hekmatyar admitted that he is still holding Russian POWs and would only release them if the Russian Government agreed to halt printing Afghan currency on behalf of the Rabbani government. Our Assistant Secretary responded that this was inappropriate under international law and urged Hekmatyar to release the prisoners immediately. Masood pledged that all POWs formerly under his control had been released. President Rabbani promised to check to see whether forces loyal to him were holding such prisoners. I had a good meeting with Assistant Secretary Raphel just before leaving Washington. We discussed the possibility of sending one of our Russian-speaking diplomats to Kabul. The diplomat would attempt to meet with these Russian prisoners to see if any of them want to return, if this is O.K. with you. As you know, several faction leaders say that many do not want to return to Russia.

I am also pleased to report that we have found answers to several of the questions you posed to us in September regarding Soviet personnel missing in Ethiopia, Korea, and elsewhere. We have determined that six Soviet advisors who disappeared in Ethiopia in 1978 were executed by a Somali group shortly after being captured. We have also uncovered new information about Soviet aircrews lost in two air battles over Korea.

Before we discuss these issues in detail, I would like to note that this new information was provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. As you can see, the CIA is cooperating with our efforts to account for missing Soviet personnel. I ask once again that the Russian security services reciprocate this good faith. I am told that up until now, neither the Ministry of Security nor the SVRR (Sluzhba vneshnei razvedki Rossiiskoi Federatsii--Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation) has provided us a single document pertaining to American POWs. As I have said many times in the past, I realize how difficult it must be for intelligence officers to cooperate with the former enemy. But while it has not been easy for my friends at the CIA, they are nevertheless cooperating with our search for information on your missing servicemen. I urge Russia's security services to do the same.

I would now like to ask Mr. Dennis Clift, the Chief of Staff of the Defense Intelligence Agency, to provide further details on what we have learned about your personnel missing in Ethiopia and Korea.

Clift: Thank you. In September, our Russian counterparts passed us a list of missing Soviet citizens. The first entry on that list concerned Soviet advisors carrying out a combat mission in Ethiopia in 1978. We have located one intelligence report from 1979 which we have declassified and now give to the Russian Side. The document states that in July of 1978 the Western Somali Liberation Front captured in the Ogaden seven Soviet advisors, including one woman, with the highest ranking military advisor being a colonel. When the Somali Liberation Front tried to bring the Soviet troops into Somalia, the Somali National Army commander said he was under orders not to do so. The Somali Liberation Front then executed six of the Soviets. The Somali National Army then allowed the Somali Liberation Front to bring the remaining prisoner to Hargeysa for interrogation. He was subsequently transferred to Mogadishu. Six were executed; one remained. Today, we give you this document.

Two other entries on the list dealt with air actions during the Korean War. We have discovered that our official naval histories of the Korean War carried detailed reports on these air actions, namely 18 November 1952 and 4 September 1950. We are giving you these reports which address the circumstances of loss of your aircraft and provide information on the death of crewmembers. We have just discovered these reports, and we will continue to look to see if there is more information on these incidents.

Finally, the packet of information that we are providing also contains the interim report of our field investigators who were in Armenia at the September 1952 C-130 crash site. We will be discussing that report during the working group session this afternoon.

Toon: I would also like to mention briefly that we will be traveling to Minsk after we leave Moscow in order to open new channels of cooperation on the POW-MIA issue with the Belarussian Government. While there, I hope to make a media appeal to Belarussian citizens--as I have many times to the citizens of Russia--to provide our Embassy any information they may have on U.S. POWs. We have found our similar visits to Kiev, the Baltic capitals, and Yerevan to be of great value.

In closing, General Volkogonov, I would like to thank you once again for your devotion to our shared humanitarian mission. We are working hard on your behalf, and I know that you personally are doing the same for us. I look forward to the next three days of discussions, and anticipate that when we convene for our closing plenary, both sides of the Joint Commission will have a clearer picture of what happened to their fellow countrymen who remain unaccounted for.

That concludes my report, but let me add a personal statement on this. You will note that we have made a number of complaints, but we have done this in the spirit of open and frank discussion and only with the purpose of improving our work. We hope that you take these complaints in that vein.

Volkogonov: Thank you, Ambassador Toon. Please allow me to make my remarks. But before I start my presentation, there were some questions raised in the esteemed Ambassador's report. I can tell you that my first impression is that the report was as interesting as it was pointed. I am also inclined to believe that your report was frank and candid, and we will act in the same manner. Once again I would like to confirm that there are no permanent officials on our Commission.

Some of your questions were a complete surprise to me; in particular, those concerning access to the archives in Podolsk and Gatchina. Unfortunately, I was not informed about this. If I had been informed, I would have tried to gain this access.

I welcome the idea of Colonel Parr having direct contact with the Co-Chairmen of the working groups.

It is my understanding that the Korean War will be of the most concern, as far as the working group sessions for today and tomorrow go.

We can agree to start preparatory planning for the trip to Magadan next spring.

I had a long discussion with Mrs. Mandra and her brother. I believe that during the working group sessions we can discuss the details.

Concerning special camps: we have found that there were 11 special camps. General Kalinin will give a report on 4 of the camps during the working group sessions. The problem is that after the congress, the camps' status changed: they became ordinary camps. There is a great deal of information in the archives; they also contain the files for ordinary criminals. It takes time to look through five archives.

The Foreign Minister in his position has a right to make statements which he thinks are proper. Personally, I believe we have a right to exchange unclassified information through normal channels, even if the information is not pleasant.

Since there has been a request to provide a written statement on the number of American citizens returned to the U.S. after World War II and the number that stayed in Russia, we can prepare such a statement.

On the Kurile Islands: We arranged for a trip there. Unfortunately, we only established a burial site. So far, we will not be able to identify the bodies unless additional work is done.

We appreciate the information on Soviet citizens left behind in Afghanistan. We're also grateful for the information on the Soviet advisors in the Ogaden in Ethiopia. We have more information on this incident which is quite dramatic. An Ethiopian citizen claims that 3 years ago he saw one of the advisors alive in Ethiopia. We cannot confirm this information, but the fact that Colonel Dolov [as heard] may have been kept alive in prison for 11 years raises some bitter feelings.

It will be very interesting to us to hear your report on your trip to Armenia.

Ambassador Toon, we welcome your going to Belarus. We also wish to be open and frank with the issues. I personally spoke three times on television channel number one and discussed the work of the Commission. We received a number of phone calls, but the information provided was general in nature. However, the fact that people know about the work of the Commission is good.

Now, several points on the role of the Commission. This is the seventh time that we are meeting in such company. Everyone knows of the problems we have in arranging our work. Therefore, I will try to avoid a long introduction and go straight to the points. Over the next three days, all specific issues will be dealt with honestly, frankly, and in detail.

It is my understanding that the most important issue is the Korean War. On the one hand, we often hear of alleged facts and conclusions from the American press. On the other hand, we know that despite our effort we cannot substantiate the claim that U.S. POWs were transferred to the Soviet Union. It reminds me of a science problem: if a hypothetical situation is raised, then it is necessary to find the proof. Now we must find the proof. If I had found something of importance, I would have immediately handed it over to you. I am a responsible person and will act that way. Despite this, I feel that we are making progress on the Korean War issue. The first problem is the fate of U.S. servicemen in Korea. The second problem is the transfer of U.S. servicemen to Soviet soil.

Concerning the first problem, we had some success: We clarified the number of POWs, places of detention, names, and the coordinates of more than 1000 crash sites of American aircraft. A careful look at this material requires a great deal of time. The bulk of these documents was given to the U.S. side. Last September, under my direction, we conducted an additional check of Korean War archives. We were aided by Chief Archivist Pkhoya, who is present here today. We found no new information. This means that we already gave you all the important information that we have.

Concerning the second problem--the transfer of U.S. servicemen to the Soviet Union--we have jointly established that in certain cases Soviet personnel directly participated in the interrogation of Americans on the territory of Korea. We also established that questions used in interrogations had been compiled by Soviets. Forty-nine interrogations were found in our archives. After last September's meeting, we found

out for sure that some U.S. hardware and aircraft were taken to the USSR. For example, General Blagoveshchenskiy, the head of the aviation design bureau at that time, is still alive, and he will meet with you. However, he didn't know anything about U.S. POWs. On the one hand, new evidence has been found confirming what we knew before, but, on the other hand, nothing new has been added to what we already knew.

At the request of the U.S. side, we examined documents and verbal evidence on 11 cases of probable transfer of Korean War era POWs to the Soviet Union. We looked at all the evidence you gave us both in its individual components and as a whole. Unfortunately, the evidence is circumstantial, from second-hand and third-hand accounts. We can say that there is no smoke without fire; or if something is spoken about, then there must be some truth to it. However, where are those people? Are they dead or alive? There simply is no proof. I have spoken to many people who claim to know about cases of U.S. POWs in the Soviet Union. For example, Mr. Pugantsev appears to be just a bluff. Many people can't even answer simple questions.

However, in two cases we deal directly with eyewitnesses: Colonel Malinin and Colonel Derskij. I believe that their evidence is not flawless. What kind of person can recognize in a photograph someone he saw 30 years ago from a second floor window? Here Colonel Malinin refers to Colonel Orlenko who can confirm his story. The latter Orlenko, KGB chief at that time, denies this fact. We established that this KGB prison had not been built yet. A KGB interrogator, Mr. Terent'ev, who worked there for 10 years, is willing to testify that there were no Americans there at that time. Orlenko and his deputy, Tikhomirov, live in Moscow, and a meeting can be arranged with them. Although Malinin lives outside of Moscow, we can meet with him as well.

Colonel Derskij, who lives in Kiev, was a military advisor to the 4th Infantry Division, but here there is also a loose end. He claims that 2 U.S. POWs, Andreyko and Dean, were transferred to the Soviet Union. The American Side knows that there was no Lieutenant Colonel Andreyko and that General Dean was not sent to the Soviet Union, but was repatriated.

Thus, based on our information, we can only speak hypothetically about U.S. POWs in the Soviet Union. We do not rule out such a possibility, but so far we do not possess any evidence to substantiate this claim. Though the Stalin regime may have been capable of anything, we still need proof and direct evidence. This is not only in the interests of the U.S. side, but this is in our interests as well.

As far as the Vietnam War is concerned, I reiterate that we are not responsible for the dates and facts in the Vietnam documents. After the documents are declassified, we hand them over just as they are. I believe that the Vietnamese could say more about this, and the U.S. should establish links with them. We have checked all the information in Russian channels. The Khabarovsk document, an alleged copy of a KGB document which contains information on transfers to Khabarovsk, was scrutinized and found to be a fraud. The information concerning Krasnodar was not confirmed either; we visited the site and the case is not closed. We're ready to continue investigating all the facts and evidence. Russian President Yeltsin said that it is necessary to provide full and honest answers to all questions. I turned to the President for help, and this is what he told me.

On the 10 Cold War cases: Our understanding is that the U.S. side considers the death of crew members in the 8 April 1950 incident over the Baltic Sea as unconfirmed. If you read the materials from the Naval Archives, there can be no doubt that the crew died since the aircraft crashed and there were no lifesaving means available. There are also the 13 June 52 and the 29 July 53 incidents in the Pacific, the 1 July 50 incident in the Barents Sea, and the 13 December 65 incident in the Black Sea. There are 5 cases which the U.S. Side considers as unconfirmed. We are searching for new information on proof of death. Concerning the incident of 1952, we discovered a new witness. He appeared out of nowhere and, he will be here today at the working group. He has a ring which belonged to one of the pilots, and he will tell his story today. In the second case, we found Rybakov, who refuses to meet with the Americans. He spoke with Lieutenant Colonel Osipov and told him what he knows. Both cases -- Saiko and Rybakov -- will be discussed in the working group. Although we haven't answered all questions, we have made considerable progress in these cases.

We found some sensational documents. We found a document signed by Stalin on how to deal with U.S. pilots who made forced landings on USSR territory. The document was signed in 1944. The document gives the method for treating Americans, even though they were are allies. This document is still in the personal archive of Stalin and is still classified. We will give it to you as soon as it is declassified. In our view, we must do our best to find final answers, positive or negative. My suggestion is that the Commission should work for several more months in order not to leave questions unanswered.

You were absolutely right in that a new commission has been established to find out about all foreigners who fell on Soviet soil. Countries like Spain, Britain, Finland, and Italy followed the U.S. example in sending us their requests. The U.S. is leading the way in this area. There are a number of facts that indicate a large number of Soviet citizens disappeared while serving in the military or in some other capacity such as military advisors, civilians, and diplomats. We are not at all interested in people who defected of their own free will. For example, several years ago the Soviet physicist Alexis??? disappeared in Madrid. He was a close aid to Moiseev. He did research on nuclear winter. Had he been a defector, he would have appeared, but there is no information about him. I'm thankful to the U.S. Side for urging us to pursue this noble humanitarian cause. For seventy years we have not dealt with these issues. If you receive any information on Russian MIAs, please share it with us.

In conclusion, the Commission's work should continue for several more months on Korean War and Cold War issues. 1) Concerning the trip to Washington, we accept your offer and it would be reasonable to do this after 2-3 months in order to gather more information, 2) We found the names and addresses of people who may have been involved in certain incidents, and we can arrange for meetings with them, 3) I'm convinced that all the Russian colleagues have a sincere interest to answer all questions. Let's now have a break for tea or coffee and we can talk during the intermission.

[Commission breaks for 15 minutes.]

Toon: General, thank you very much for your presentation. Most of the points you made will be taken up during the working group sessions over the next few days. Meanwhile, some of the points will not be discussed in the working groups.

First, I was surprised to hear of the problem with access to the archives in Gatchina and Podolsk. Frankly, after our last meeting both of us decided that there would be no more difficulties. I was also surprised that you heard nothing of this problem. Perhaps it would be useful if I called on Colonel Parr to explain the nature of the problem he has faced in gaining access. Colonel.

Parr: Mister Ambassador, thank you. General Volkogonov, colleagues. Following the meeting in September, our office asked for access to the archives. We hoped to work with the senior archivist at the Naval Archives at Gatchina. We received permission to go to Gatchina, but the officials there could not speak with us on matters concerning the Commission's work and, in any case, the documents that we needed would be declassified and sent to us here. This seemed illogical, but we waited. When they arrived in November, we noted -- and the Russian Side noted -- that they were not complete. Further, the maps were xeroxed and of poor quality. We had hoped to make digital colored copies of the originals after they had been declassified.

On Podolsk: We are waiting for the appropriate time, General Volkogonov, to schedule a visit. We are advised by your staff that until this is done we should not go there. The reason is the same: the officials can't discuss the Commission's work. I don't wish to place my colleagues in trouble with their headquarters. If I am mistaken, please answer.

Toon: That's the nature of the problem. If there are any questions, please put them to Colonel Parr now.

Volkogonov: We have the Deputy of the Archives Center here. Everything concerning this matter should be addressed to him. There should be no problem. If we request documents, they should be provided to us. At the end of the plenary, I will accompany a group to Podolsk myself.

Toon: Thank you, General. I hope the problem will be solved.

With regard to the Foreign Minister's statement, he can say anything he wants, but what bothered me was the infringement on our arrangement with you on access to information on U.S. POWs in Vietnam. If you are now committed to clear everything with the Vietnamese, then we have a bit of a problem. I want to raise this issue with the Foreign Minister because this is a real problem for our country. There has been a great deal of publicity, and I must get some clarification.

Volkogonov: I would like to reiterate the point that had the Foreign Ministry decided to search for POWs on their own, then of course we would be unnecessary. As Co-Chairman, it is my opinion that we have the right to decide issues in our Commission. The Commission represents the needs of the Russian people and we don't need to clear our decisions with others. We will provide documents to you as they become declassified.

Toon: Finally, General, regarding the Korea report which was passed to you during the last Commission meeting. It was not designed to prove to you that the Soviet Union was involved in the transfer of Korean War POWs to the USSR. After my long experience with the Soviet Government, I am convinced that they would leave no stone unturned to get technical information from U.S. POWs. But that's my personal opinion, and I can't prove it. The report contained interviews, documents, and other sources on POWs in the Korean War. Its only purpose is to help you fathom from your archives any information on this question. This will be discussed further in the working group.

One final point on the question of the working group chairmen and vice chairmen coming to Washington. We had envisioned them coming earlier than you had planned: we had in mind 15 February. But this can be worked out through Colonel Parr and others here.

Now, with your permission, General, I'd like to call on our congressional colleagues to say a few words.

Peterson: Thank you, Ambassador, General. It's interesting that the people on the Commission are the same people who started out with us two years ago. The fact that the same individuals are still here points to the commitment of them to find our missing. As we have said, this is purely a humanitarian mission and we all agreed that it has historical significance. Never before, as I know, has an undertaking like this proceeded to this level. I think that now the easy part has been done and we are just starting the hard half. Both sides agreed to work hard to declassify documents related to the issue. We had to work hard with our intelligence agencies in the States to declassify documents. You can see from the reports today that our side is starting to give information. For us to proceed, it is important to work hard on both sides on the declassification issue. We understand that this is a massive task and difficult, but it must be done.

In response to one of the statements, I don't want to leave the impression that Vietnam is not an important part of the Commission's work. The major reason that we don't have more issues is because we don't have many documents from that era. If you look at the spectrum of documents provided by the Russian Side, there are very few provided from this war; but this war should produce the most documents. The Korean War is important and the Cold War must be cleared up, but the American public is focused on Vietnam.

We look forward to working with our colleague Mr. Kozlov in the Vietnam War working group. We have much to discuss. Thank you.

Toon: One comment: if the easy part is done and the hard part is ahead, I should think about retirement.

Peterson: We'll take our golf clubs with us.

Johnson: Thank you. It's a pleasure for me to be associated with such a distinguished group for over a year. I agree with what Congressman Peterson said on Vietnam and on declassification. Since I've been associated with the Korean War working group, I've come to the opinion that it's a sleeping giant and we are about to awaken it. Because of the vast numbers, we plan to bring attention to this matter and we plan to resolve this issue. We know that the militaries of both nations were involved in this war. Colonel Orlov

participated in Korea. I flew in both Korea and Vietnam. We need to put people who were involved from both sides together. Additionally, camaraderie alone won't solve that problem. It's in both of our national interests to involve China in unlocking doors to information on both Korea and Vietnam. And I believe they would clear my golf clubs through customs.

Toon: General, I believe you have a guest you'd like to invite.

Volkogonov: Yes, we have here Colonel-General Vladimir Abramov who was the Chief Military Advisor in Vietnam from 1967 to 1968.

Abramov: Distinguished Co-Chairmen, Commission members. I will address three points which are of great concern to the Commission. 1) On the Soviet people's relation to American pilots: I was present at an airfield in late July 1944 where six R-47 Mustangs made forced landings. They took off from Italy and flew over Romania on a bombing mission. They lost their way and were forced to land. Everyone was very friendly and we shook hands. The U.S. pilots showed us their cockpits. Several of us could speak English, therefore we could communicate. We fed the U.S. pilots in the officers' mess. The U.S. pilots refueled and took off. Not a single Soviet aviator questioned or interrogated them. This fact shows that we were brothers-in-arms. 2) Concerning the Korean War and, in particular, those pilots taken prisoner: In 1952 I was commander of a fighter aviation regiment, and in 1953 I was an officer in charge of training pilots who were being sent to Korea. We were briefed on the contents of classified wires and documents. We were interested in tactics, not pilots: how to fight them. We met some Russian pilots who won some dog-fights in Korea. I spoke many times with Air Force Marshal Savitskij. He told me that a number of aircraft were brought to the Soviet Union. However, I never heard any rumors or information about a single American pilot being brought to Russia. If this had happened, I would have been able to meet and talk with him. Personally, I don't believe that pilots were transferred to the Soviet Union for interrogation. There first has to be a purpose, otherwise it would be senseless. 3) On Vietnam: I was assigned as the Chief Soviet Military Advisor in Vietnam and served there from August 1967 to December 1968. All Soviet servicemembers have a friendly attitude towards the American people and praise their attempts to find MIAs and POWs. This is also good for the Soviet Government.

I met the Chairman on the U.S. Side of the Vietnam War working group. The question asked was, did the Soviets participate in taking U.S. servicemen prisoner? We had no personal weapons. The U.S. Side needs information that some U.S. prisoners were taken. They have some photos; however, there is some doubt because the pilots wore helmets not hats. Also, the Vietnamese saw persons of the Caucasian race as being similar. If we had taken part in capturing U.S. servicemen, then we could have been killed as well. I did hear some information about U.S. POWs; for instance, when high-ranking persons were captured.

There were no interrogations of U.S. POWs conducted by us. None took place. I, as an advisor, would have had a professional interest. Although, we did compile a questionnaire to aid the Vietnamese in interrogating U.S. pilots. After we received the answers to these questions, we found that they had just quoted regulations from U.S. manuals.

On the probable transfer of POWs to the Soviet Union: Some people claim that there are documents in Party archives, but I have some doubts about this. I had close contact with Ambassador Shcherbakov and received reports from him and his subordinates. If such transfers had taken place, then the advisors would have known about them. For example, I know that in 1973 or 74 the U.S. Air Force tried to rescue American POWs from a prison in Shantai [as heard] about 40 kilometers from Hanoi. Even though the Vietnamese air defense was taken by surprise, they managed to shoot down a U.S. helicopter. The U.S. POWs had been moved two days earlier. The Americans managed to rescued the helicopter crew. Twenty years have gone by and according to the old Russian proverb 'You can't hide a cat in a bag'. In other words, something would have surfaced. I believe that any transfer is very unlikely. We Russian Vietnam War veterans have close contact with U.S. veterans. We receive questions from them and we forward the questions to our groups in Kharkov, Kiev and other places.

Toon: Thank you, General Abramov. With so many young people on both sides of the Commission, it's

good to meet a fellow World War II veteran.

Volkogonov: I believe now Mr. Kozlov would like to say something.

Kozlov: Thank you, General Volkogonov, Ambassador Toon. I admire Ambassador Toon's presentation because he succeeded in presenting his remarks and complaints to the Russian Side very professionally. Those remarks dealt with technical matters relating to the nature of our work. There was one place in Ambassador Toon's speech that raised some doubt. It dealt not only with technical matters, but also with methodology. Mr. Toon said that the Russian Side must make a statement in writing to close the World War II issue. Several doubts were raised. Within the framework of the Commission, we are looking for one issue: the truth. The truth which, apart from the human side, has a historical significance as well. There is no doubt that it is the truth which matters most. Concerning World War II, the Russian Side has provided a number of documents which will enable us to resolve the fates of U.S. servicemen from World War II. It seems to me that the statement should be prepared and signed jointly. If the U.S. Side still has some doubts, they must formulate them precisely.

Toon: Thank you, Mr. Kozlov. I have no problem with that and I will get back to you when I get back to Washington.

Kozlov: I'd like to add a few more points. The same issue arises with Korea, Vietnam, and the Cold War. That's why we should agree on some methodological issues and establish some parameters so that we can realize the goal of closing the issue. From a technical point of view, one side must admit that a certain question was justified, the other side must admit that the documents provided were complete and thorough. We should discuss the details.

Toon: Very good.

Mazurov: Ambassador Toon, I'm very satisfied that before September's and today's meetings there were no insinuations in the U.S. press against the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service. This is the result of your work. Second, I'm happy, and this view is shared by everyone, that the CIA is involved in our work. Third, I'd like to ask the interpreter to translate the passage dealing with the evaluation of the Foreign Service work.

[Translator reads following passage from Ambassador Toon's presentation.]

I am told that up until now, neither the Ministry of Security nor the SVRRF has provided us a single document pertaining to American POWs. As I have said many times in the past, I realize how difficult it must be for intelligence officers to cooperate with the former enemy. But while it has not been easy for my friends at the CIA, they are nevertheless cooperating with our search for information on your missing servicemen. I urge Russia's security services to do the same.

Mazurov: You are mistaken. We have provided information. We provided two lists. The first list contains the names of 510 U.S. servicemen. The second list contains the names of 4 U.S. servicemen and was handed over before the September session. We have strict instructions to report to General Volkogonov on any information that we have. You have met with the leadership of the intelligence services. I am planning a meeting to give an appraisal of our work. Please give me a recommendation on how to present your estimation of our work to Mr. Primakov.

Toon: I was speaking about documents, and if I am wrong, I apologize. I will have to check. But please convey my warmest greetings to Mr. Primakov. What we want from him is all the information that he has in his files pertaining to U.S. POWs. If he satisfies this, then we will go on with our relationship from there.

Mazurov: As a representative of the archives of the intelligence services, I can say that the information that we have is on the list of 510 which is information passed to us from Chinese and Korean officials. No Soviet intelligence officer took part in the interrogation of POWs in Korea or Vietnam. Therefore, we

don't have any additional records.

Volkogonov: I suggest that we have a break. I think that this dialogue or 'showdown' is designed to lift our spirits before lunch.

The Vietnam War working group will meet at the entrance and Tanya [Koltovich] will show the way. The Korean War working group will meet here and Lieutenant Colonel Osipov will show the way for the Cold War working group.

[End of session.]

Minutes of the Cold War Working Group 7th Plenary Session of the USRJC Moscow, Russia, 6-7 DEC 93

The Cold War Working Group (CWWG) sessions were held at the Roskomarchiv building at Il'yinka 12, in the suite of offices occupied by General Volkogonov and his staff. The chairmen of the CWWG were, for the American side, A. Denis Clift, Chief of Staff, Defense Intelligence Agency; and for the Russian side, Gen.-Major Anatoli Krayushkin, Russian Ministry of Security.

Attendees at the 6 DEC session included, for the American side: Mr. Clift, Major William Burkett, Major Leslie Rubin, SSG Henry Eastman, and Mr. Norm Kass. For the Russian side: Gen. Krayushkin, Col Mukhin (MOD Archives), Gen. Kalinin (MVD), Mr. Nikishkin (Archives), LTC Osipov, Vasily Saiko, and Mr. Seteblin.

At 1500, Gen. Krayushkin started by saying that the CWWG should go over the outstanding questions posed by the American side. He felt the CWWG needed to go over what was known, and where to go from here. He stated he was not suggesting winding up the work of the Commission, just that it was necessary to focus on the outstanding questions, for the working group sessions and for the future as well.

Mr. Clift said that he was struck by Gen. Volkogonov's statement that the work of the Commission would go on for another few months until the US side got the answers it sought. At the outset of the session, Mr. Clift re-extended the invitation to Gen. Krayushkin to visit Washington in February. Krayushkin accepted the invitation. Clift continued that nearing the end of two years of the life of the Commission, both sides had made progress in this humanitarian undertaking. This has been of particular importance to the families - Reynolds, Sanderson, Bourg - and all the other Cold War families. In September, the Russian side began to give us documents the US side thought were very important. These documents indicated that each of these incidents was reported to the highest levels of the Soviet government, and given the highest priority. Mr. Clift noted that we are fortunate in a sense to be able to deal with 10 concrete problems. With the assistance of LTC Osipov, he continued, the US side must determine which documents we have received from your side of those promised in September, and which the US side has yet to receive.

Mr. Clift then turned the focus to the issue of access to Gatchina and Podolsk. He found this morning's conversation useful on this issue. The most important information the US side has received on the C-130 case, for example, came from Podol'sk. Now the US side desires to move from documents that report the facts of the case to search and rescue (SAR) documents.

When members of the Commission were in Gatchina in September 1993, he continued, we saw a chart with annotations on the 29 JUL 53 case. The US side is particularly interested in SAR documents because we believe that therein lies the best hope for mention of survivors - or no mention. This can guide our researchers in their efforts to find evidence of survivors.

Mr. Clift stated he would like to review the question of gun camera photography. LTC Osipov gave the US side photos of the C-130 last September. He said that these were the only photos still in existence, yet documents we received from the Russian side indicate that gun camera footage was recorded. Moreover, Soviet pilots have reported to the US side that they have their own photos at home, or we could see them

at the Archives whenever they wished. Questions raised for discussion at this working group session follow:

1. What new information do you have for us? 2. Review the status of documents received. 3. Review status of outstanding documents promised to us. 4. Access to Gatchina and Podol'sk. 5. Access to SAR documents. 6. Are there more gun camera or other photos that will shed light on these incidents?

Gen. Krayushkin said that the issues were clear, that there is a mutual desire for progress, to bring clarity to the issues. Amb. Toon stated this morning that work stops when the Commission leaves. Gen. Krayushkin believed that to be a misperception, since he was certain that work had continued with a very clear purpose based on US questions. He said the CWWG would see an example of that. There are no obstacles in the way of productive work. No matter how emotional Col. Mazurov got last time, work continues to go forward. Gen. Krayushkin learned about a meeting among Mazurov, Volkogonov and Primakov, so no opposition was expected from that quarter. At previous meetings, the most acute problems were relating to Korea.

For the past several weeks, the Russian side has focused on Korea. They claim to have looked at over 300 volumes of records for the years 1950-54, and reviewed materials from the Military Counter Intelligence, from the intelligence departments of the Border Guard Troops stationed in the Far East, the Far East Military District, the Primorski Krai, the Transbaikal Military District, the Pacific Fleet and the Amur Flotilla. They studied reports to the CinC, Naval Forces, and from the advisors in China and Korea. Russian analysts went over all the counterintelligence reports in the Soviet Air Force, and the correspondence between the State Security Ministry with its representatives in Chita and Amur. They also looked at Interior Ministry reports on prison transfers in the region. Gen Krayushkin stated he risked boring members of the CWWG with all this, but he wanted to indicate how many documents they looked at. They didn't find any documents which indicate the transfer of U.S. POWs into the USSR. They found no documents on pilot survivors. This won't close the issue, he continued, but stressed that this was part of a detailed and broad search. Gen. Krayushkin prepared a letter for Volkogonov on this matter, and further stated he took full responsibility for the documents he signed. He stressed he assumed responsibility before the Commission, and also before his president (Yeltsin). Evidence has been presented in previous [plenary and working group] rounds. If that is not convincing, he continued, the Russian side could bring in outside witnesses. Gen Krayushkin believes this case to be closed, but the US side does not. The CWWG must categorize certain cases and separate them out - we need to come to some joint statement. Otherwise we just keep going over the same facts. It is necessary to present a summary document - to put certain issues aside, and go forward on others.

Mr. Clift asked whether this exhaustive review covered only 1950-54? Krayushkin replied in the affirmative. So, Clift said, nothing about the Cold War period after that, from 1955-65? No, said Krayushkin, we didn't look past 1954. LTC Osipov noted that 5 of the 10 Cold War incidents happened during that time. Mr. Clift said that, while the US side would fully respect his view that the Russian side had done everything possible on any one case, Clift could not agree that the US side had done all it could. The US side has more issues that need to be addressed. Krayushkin said that that is reason the Russian side is still working. Clift said to proceed to the specifics.

Krayushkin said that the U.S. side has presented a document which purports to be correspondence from the KGB in Khabarovsk with a North Korean general. It took us a long time to obtain, and the Russians were puzzled to find out that the document is false. They sent a copy of the document to the Khabarovsk KGB, and sent a representative out there as follow-up. It is document 10/1 - 1645, dated 13 May 1988, signed by the deputy chief of the Khabarovsk KGB Perizhnyak. He said he never had any contacts with the North Koreans, and denies that the document could exist. He could not have signed such a document on 13 May 1988, because he didn't take over until 16 May 1988. Gen. Krayushkin stated that the document is falsified. Mr. Clift asked whether this had been shared with the Korean War Working Group. Krayushkin said that they would do so tomorrow, but that he wanted to vouch for the work of the security services on this issue. He noted that this is precisely one of the cases on which we could provide summary work. Krayushkin then turned to LTC Osipov.

Osipov said that, at the request of the American side, the US side studied completely all the cases, but met with no success in the 1950-54 time frame. The second approach is to interview people who participated in the shootdowns, all the pilots who were involved. The majority of these people are not alive, but there are around 10 who are, and Osipov knows 6 addresses and phone numbers. the Russian side found a pilot from the 1950 shootdown alive in Riga. Rybakov, the pilot from the 1953 incident has been interviewed. And there are other ground and air participants. Most importantly, Osipov continued, the CWWG can close one question that has been in dispute: the 7 OCT 52 incident near Yuri Island. Osipov went on to describe the incident and to introduce an eyewitness - Vasili Ivanovich Saiko, whose account is attached (TAB A).

BREAK

Krayushkin turned to Col Mukhin. Mukhin said that they continued to work at the MoD archives. When he saw Col Parr in September, he asked him about missing Russian servicemen. COL Parr promised to go to America and send them the documents. Their next meeting occurred on 26 NOV, at which time he received documents and questions on U.S. servicemen. The time remaining until 6 DEC was short, but thanks to the chief of the MoD archives, they were able to find some answers. There are no more photos. COL Mukhin's director said that they don't keep them, and they had already turned over what they had. Clift asked if there were a separate archive where photos are kept. Mukhin replied yes, but only in the Central Archive, and only on special cases. There are archives that store movies and photos, but not of that kind. Clift said that the documents on the 13 JUN 52 incident indicate that there was film taken. Mukhin said that they were later destroyed. While waiting for LTC Osipov, Col Mukhin asked about Soviet losses. Mr. Clift said he'd be happy to answer these questions. Mukhin said that there were 7 aircraft lost. On 3 of those cases, the US side provided information. Clift said that the US side would continue to work this list and was optimistic that more information would be found. Mukhin said that, yes, and there are 4 more, especially two. On 15 JUL 64, the crew of a TU-2 flew over a U.S. carrier group. After that communications with the plane ceased. Mukhin wanted aircraft logs, reports, etc. It is likely that the air defense system saw the plane - it probably exploded, or was shot down. On 25 MAY 68, personnel of the Essex watched what happened to a Soviet aircraft. The Russian side's priority is to obtain submarine logbook that has been discovered. The US side has already returned the bell. The logbook would be with the bell. Mr. Clift noted that Ambassador Toon had addressed the submarine incident at the morning plenary, that the U.S. side was turning over further information, information that Ambassador Toon said should close the case.

After LTC Osipov said that his report would take at least one hour, it was agreed that the CWWG would come back the next day to hear the report of the Russian side.

7 December session, 1000 hours.

Gen. Krayushkin opened the meeting by saying that he had to attend the 1100 meeting between Amb. Toon and Minister of Security Stepashin. LTC Osipov was designated to chair the meeting in his absence. If there is more work to be done, they would come back after lunch.

Mr. Clift said he was delighted to see Mr. Saiko again this morning. Gen. Volkogonov would speak to him about giving us the ring. That was a most remarkable event. Krayushkin agreed. Clift continued that he would like to go over each of the cases, establish where we are, and decide future courses of action. While waiting for LTC Osipov, Clift said to Krayushkin how much importance the US side attached to the role played by Krayushkin's ministry. The Border Guards played a role in all these incidents. Joint research with the Russian side has produced considerable information. US interviews with pilots had them refer to gun camera photos. A picture is worth 1000 words, and the pictures of the C-130 were on CNN - nationally. Clift once again declared his interest in locating the gun camera photos.

Krayushkin replied that the MoD archivist should answer that, and try to find them. He didn't think there would be any obstacles on all cases where they are in existence. He noted he passed to the US side photos on the 1960 case (Note: the only photos we have received have been on the 1958 case over Armenia). Krayushkin further stated that if photos are found in the security organs, he would give them to the US

side, but he felt they'd more likely be in the MoD files. Best case, they duplicated them.

Krayushkin continued, saying Saiko said the body of Captain Dunham was given to the Border Guard troops. He said he would talk with the Border Guard Central archivists - find out whether there is documentary evidence of a burial and try to find the site. He will try to find the files of the Border Guard station.

Mr. Clift asked about another incident, that of Posa. Has there been any further information developed in the Severomorsk area?

Krayushkin replied that there had been steps taken. He asked the Deputy Chief of Security in Murmansk, and veterans of the KGB in the Northern Fleet area. He has looked at the KGB Central Archive in Murmansk. Today, there is no documentary evidence on what happened. Everybody remembers and confirms, but Krayushkin claims there's no evidence. He believes that the Northern Fleet needs to find the fishermen who picked up the body, and, following this plenary session, promised to ask the local department to find the crew. Clift asked if the crew would have reported to the Northern Fleet. Krayushkin said probably not, but he said he knew where the information should be, and they needed to find the crew.

Mr. Clift said that yesterday they got Mr. Saiko through the media. He said he would ask Col Parr to work with LTC Osipov to advertise the work of the Commission in the Northern Fleet area in the local papers. Krayushkin agreed, and said he would mention it tomorrow at the closing plenary.

LTC Osipov said that Col Parr and he had agreed: Saiko will turn over the ring to the US side at a press conference. A Christmas gift to the family, said Krayushkin.

Clift asked Gen. Kalinin if his ministry had done further work. Kalinin said yes, and passed to the US side a document detailing the "Special Camp" system in existence from 1948-55 in the USSR. Kalinin went over all the camp archives where the MVD looked for evidence of Americans. None was found. He took full responsibility for this statement. Kalinin then went over the record of COL Malinin, and asserted that Malinin had no relation to the camps, and could not possess that information. They will continue to search their files, and offered to go to any of these camps with the U.S. side. Clift thanked him for his work, and called it a challenge for the archivists. The Russian side then said again that there were no Americans in the camps except for the ones we already knew about. Clift then said that he wanted to go over the 10 Cold War cases in order.

LTC Osipov said on the 8 APR 50 case, that all documents had been examined. All archives have reported. The military archives are trying to put together a list of all those involved, from radar operator to pilot. All the data they have would be turned over to the US side, he asserted. The Regiment Commander is alive and living in Bobrusk, Belarus. There are lots of cases of pilots settling in Belarus and Ukraine after retirement. The pilot is ready to meet with members of the Commission. All interviews left no doubt - there were no survivors. All evidence indicates that the crew died. Mr. Clift thanked Osipov, and said that the US side will now have to present this evidence to our government and decide how to proceed. In September, the US side was informed of a new document from the Air Force. Osipov said it was naval, not air. Osipov received a memo from Gatchina after the visit and said he could provide the US side with a copy. Clift asked for a copy, then asked why all SAR data dates from 22 APR. What about 8-21 APR? Osipov said that as a result of his interview with the Regiment Commander, the Commander flew personally to the site, saw an oil slick and debris. After that the weather worsened. No ship sailed. The U.S. side searched - the Osipov claimed to have a report on U.S. planes. 31 sorties on 13 APR. Details will be given. Clift referred to his earlier emphasis on access to Gatchina and Podol'sk, and gun camera photography. This goes for all cases. Osipov said that the issue of access would be sorted out by the General Staff and Gen. Volkogonov. Clift thanked him and said the US side was looking forward to these new documents. This will be of importance to Mrs. Reynolds.

6 NOV 51 - The Neptune was shot down. Clift asked about pilots. Osipov said that somewhere in the files they have a list of pilots and will give it to the US side. He couldn't find all of them. Clift asked if there

were any new documents, and Osipov said no.

13 JUN 52 - Osipov said that he asked their Navy, MGB and MVD about it. No debris or remains were found by Border Guard ships. It turned out that the previous memo was unfounded. The problem was that the site was 105 km east of Vladivostok, and the operating range of the ships is not that great. Clift said that this case has developed a new turn. The US side interviewed some U.S. SAR crew. They told US interviewers that they saw the plane in the water on 14 JUN 52 intact, with liferafts already deployed. For that reason, considering that we have 2 reports from Kuznetsov to Stalin, the US side is very interested in photos. Photos will be very helpful in this case.

Osipov said that according to the Air Force, gun camera film was a standard practice if the plane opened fire. At every regiment they had film development means. But no photos were made routinely. They were used for pilot assessment and were reused, erased, and used again. Clift said that this is the point: this was the Cold War, and the presence of this film was reported to Stalin. He couldn't believe they would erase it, and asked Osipov to continue to look. Osipov said that he personally asked the archives to provide the US side any information in any archive on this. The Russians haven't looked in all of them yet, but these were not items to be kept. Clift noted that if it was the period of the Cold War and Stalin was informed, these would be of historical value. Osipov said that these cases were special, but that they had checked each one at Podol'sk, and there were no photos. Either they don't exist, or they are somewhere else at a different level. Clift asked if they'd be at military museums. Osipov said that the pilots couldn't have their own film, that it was classified after being taken from the plane. In all 7 cases at Gatchina, none had photos.

BREAK

29 JUL 53 - Osipov said that there were no new documents on this case, but both pilots were alive, Rybakov in Vladivostok, and Yablonevski in Moscow. The Russian side has not spoken to the latter yet, but it is possible. Rybakov really didn't want to talk to anyone; he definitely did not want to talk to Americans, but he agreed to talk to Osipov. Osipov described the interview with Rybakov, and Rybakov told the story of going up, being directed by the ground to the intruder aircraft at about 7000 meters, being fired upon and hit by the intruder, and firing back, watching the U.S. plane go into the clouds, and he flew back to base with a badly damaged plane. He was debriefed after landing.

Clift said that in April we made a presentation and said that there were cutters in the area. In September, the Russian side confirmed this at Gatchina with a chart. Osipov agreed to provide that chart to the U.S. side. Clift said that he wanted to pursue reports of these cutters for the Sanderson family. It is the goal of the US side to find SAR reports of the Maritime Border Guards. Osipov said that he has a personal obligation to Bruce Sanderson. The MVD and the KGB never saw any survivors. He agreed the Russian side would continue to pursue this case.

LUNCH

18 APR 55 - The Russian side passed a list of 21 participants. Osipov promised to get with Col Parr on this list for interviews. Clift noted that in the files given to the US side, the Komandor witnessed the incident. Are there any Border Guard files or reports? Osipov replied that their documentation indicates that team members of the Komandor, 10 miles from the explosion, saw a column of smoke and fire. A cutter from the Kamchatka Flotilla went to investigate. This is the only detail available. The information was reported to the Defense Ministry.

10 SEP 56 - Osipov said that they have no information on this. Mr. Clift asked him to look in the context of any SAR effort that may have been conducted.

2 SEP 58 - Osipov said that the U.S. side has more than the Russian side on this incident. Mr. Clift handed over the CILHI interim report, and described its contents. Ms. Bourg and others are interested in this, and the US side will continue to look for information. Clift said the US side knows that in this case that the KGB was on the scene, and they repatriated the remains. Osipov said that they gave us the full

record on this case, including photos. There were 50 eyewitnesses - the KGB could not hide much. Krayushkin said that it was a fact based report. Isn't this enough to close the case? Clift replied that there were still questions unanswered requiring attention.

1 JUL 60 - Clift said that for the US side, there were 2 questions: what happened to 3 men, and where is Major Posa's body? Krayushkin said that the US side was given an account, but maybe they could do more. Clift said that Toon will appeal to the people of the region. Krayushkin replied that he personally would ask local radio to publicize it. Clift noted that the Russian side had given us new documents. Osipov then described the KGB document on Posa.

14 DEC 65 - Osipov said that there is only one document, one radio intercept. Clift asked for the document.

Osipov summed up by saying that the Russian side is uncertain on the 29 JUL 53 case, and on the 1 JUL 60 case, what happened to the other 3 men?

Mr. Clift said that it is important that the Russian side continue to provide documents, assist in producing witnesses, and continue to work on all cases.

Gen. Krayushkin wondered if there had been progress. Mr. Clift said that he felt that progress had indeed been made, and that the proof would be in 10 minutes, when Mr. Saiko turned over the ring.

Minutes of the Korean War Working Group 7th Plenary Session of the USRJC Moscow, Russia, 6 - 7 December 1993

The Korean War Working Group (KWWG) sessions were held at the Roskomarkhiv building at lI'yinka 12, Moscow, in the plenary meeting room. The chairmen of the KWWG were, for the American side, Congressman Sam Johnson and Mr. Richard Kauzlarich, Department of State, and for the Russian side, Professor [Colonel ret.] Orlov.

The attendees at the 6 December session included, for the American side, Dr. Trudy Peterson, National Archivist of the United States, Lieutenant Colonel Richard Barnes, analyst, Major Werner S„mmler Hindrichs, analyst, Lieutenant Colonel Nicholas Troyan, translator, and Ms. Shannon Smith, chief of staff for Congressman Johnson. The Russian side included General-Major [fnu] Lezhnikov, Ministry for Internal Affairs, General [fnu] Zaporoshenko, Director of Military Archives and former commander of the Border Guards.

The session was opened at 1500 hours by Colonel Orlov, who suggested concentrating on open issues and questions to be answered In order to strive for resolution and closure, and then laid out four general categories to be followed as the suggested Russian agenda. These were:

a. Witness testimony;

b. Testimony originating in prison camps and jails;

c. Analysis of air activity, focussed on the F-86;

d. Information originating in the interviews of Colonels Malinin and Derskiy

Colonel Orlov, referring back to the 77-page paper on the Korean War prepared by the American side as working papers for the 6th Plenary, noted that the Russian side had spent considerable effort studying this document, and hoped to resolve a number of open issues.

Congressman Johnson deferred to Mr. Kauzlarich as primary chairman for the American side, who recommended combining the two agendas. Mr. Kauzlarich, referring back to the remarks by Colonel-General Volkogonov during the plenary, echoed Ambassador Toon's sentiments concerning continued

operation of the working group principle and particularly the potential to work between plenary sessions. He also offered the assistance of the US side in supporting the new, permanent organization created by the Russian side to deal with the cases of Russians lost for all reasons during war time, and to address the cases of others lost in Russia. Returning to the Korean War, Mr. Kauzlarich outlined six areas of concern as the suggested US agenda. These included:

a. Discussion of the F-86 aircraft and pilot issue, to include an in-depth look at the mission and operations of the special group commanded by General-Major Blagoveshchenskiy, and the existence of special handling procedures for certain categories of aviators in China and North Korea;

b. Analysis of the compilation of shoot down data recently provided by the Russian side;

c. Information coming from interviews of Colonel Derskiy and sub-sources identified by him, particularly focussed on the possible transfer of Captain Thomas Helton, an F-84 pilot, and information Derskiy had concerning Major General Dean;

d. A review of previous lines of inquiry, particularly Items left open from previous plenaries and requests for information;

e. Archival analysis of the origins of documents provided by the Russian side --addressing the 'gaps' identified by the Siedling study;

f. Identification of areas worthy of emphasis in the coming months.

Congressman Johnson emphasized that the US side was not interested in assigning blame for any incidents which may have potentially occurred, but rather in expeditiously resolving the fates of the missing. He opined that the American public would hold the participants responsible for quick resolution.

Colonel Orlov stressed the need to come to closure on the lists of open cases. He was particularly pleased to note that the erstwhile list of about 8200 Missing in Action (MIAs) had been reduced to about 2200, and that the list of pilots referenced in the 77-page document had been reduced to 31. Referring to the number of witnesses cited in the document who discussed events on Soviet territory, Orlov opined that the impression was given that the USSR controlled everything, both within the Soviet Union and on North Korean and Chinese territory. This was not the case. Orlov stressed that the remaining variables could probably not be solved without direct North Korean and Chinese participation.

Congressman Johnson interjected with questions about Soviet control of Port Arthur. Colonel Orlov acknowledged that the USSR did indeed control the airspace there, but that the topic here concerned personnel transfers. Congressman Johnson was of the opinion that interrogations of prisoners took place there.

Orlov acknowledged that direct Soviet interrogations of American personnel had indeed taken place [Note: I do not believe that Orlov was addressing the issue of Port Arthur, but rather general interrogations]. Orlov affirmed that Soviet personnel could either question US pilots directly, or, as was more often the case, write down specific questions they wished to have serviced. However, according to Orlov, questions concerning the transfer of pilots to the USSR had *not been proven.*

Orlov addressed the problem of the changing testimony of Colonel Korotkov. He pointed out that Korotkov was never a KGB colonel, as he claimed, but rather a political officer. Referring to the claim of having interrogated LtCol [Vance Eugene] Black, Orlov stated that Korotkov had only been a young lieutenant in Khabarovsk, and that he, Orlov, had himself interrogated Black. He bemoaned the lack of direct, credible witness information, and likened the problem to that of LTC Corso's 'trainloads' of prisoners. Although there was considerable hearsay, there was no corroboration of the allegation. Orlov considered it purposeful to expand the circle of witnesses, and recommended that the US side investigate the retired ethnic Korean contingent in Central Asia. He particularly recommended the former DCOS of the People's Army, and Le San Cho, the former ambassador. The US side acknowledged that it had

already contacted some of the Korean personnel in question.

Colonel Orlov then turned to the issue of witnesses from jails and corrective centers. He pointed out that of the 24 witnesses who had come forward, only one had addressed the Korean War. The remainder merely address the possibility of Americans having been in the camps. He pointed out that many of these could have been *former* Americans whose family members had been voluntary participants in the *building of communism* phase of social development in the thirties through fifties.

Colonel Orlov then raised the issue of Colonel Malinin. He recounted Malinin's supposed identification of Phillip Vincent Mandra, based on a momentary glimpse of a prisoner through a second story window two decades ago, and also mentioned that the officer in whose office this incident had allegedly taken place had denied any knowledge of the existence of the special prison referred to by Malinin. He criticized the faulty use of the photographic identification. The US and the Russian sides agreed to leave the matter of Phillip Vincent Mandra to General Volkogonov and Ambassador Toon, since they were meeting with Mrs. Mandra during the course of the plenary.

Mr. Kauzlarich, referring to the 77-page Korean War study, pointed out that the document was intended to be a 'snapshot in time' of the work of the American side, and not a final product. He also stressed that the US side had gone to great lengths to eliminate some of the redundancies and weaker lines of reasoning, and that it was for this reason that the F-86 argument had become the primary line of inquiry of the American side.

Referring to the issue of direct and unconcealed Soviet involvement in the interrogation of American F-86 pilots, Major Hindrichs raised the issue of Captain Lawrence Bach, the first F-86 pilot shot down during the war on 22 December 1950. Captain Bach had indeed been interrogated by Soviet fighter pilots who had identified themselves as such, and, after the war, had been returned to the US. Major Hindrichs presented Colonel Orlov with a photograph taken of Captain Bach on the day of his shoot down, with the remark that this was what Captain Bach had looked like on that day and for the initial part of his captivity. He continued that since Captain Bach had been referenced in several documents already turned over by the Russian side, the Russian side had to possess the original transcripts of the interrogations. A high-interest intelligence target like the F-86 would necessarily require the attention of the highest levels of the military -- if not the political -- establishment. In reference to Colonel Orlov's comment that he doubted there were additional interrogations left within the former Soviet archives, Major Hindrichs referred back to Colonel Orlov's own guidance from the 6th Plenary, and passed over three prisoner confessions which had been reproduced verbatim within the Soviet open press. Since it was well known, he opined, that the Soviet media was an organ of the state and the party, it was inconceivable that these confessions did not exist in some archive -- particularly since they had been used to support an argument presented at the United Nations.

Major Hindrichs continued that the testimony of retired Colonel Bushuyev had also underscored that he had had to review '15 to 20' prisoner interrogation protocols daily. Orlov acknowledged that he had personally passed many of these interrogations to Bushuyev. The US side then emphasized that with this high number of interrogations, at least some of which were conducted by Soviet personnel, there had to he archival records of them.

Colonel Orlov acknowledged that there had to be additional interrogations on file, and that the archival search to locate these would have to be expanded.

General Zaporoshenko, looking at his own extensive experience as a [Chief of the] Border Guards, noted that there had to be archival records of anything or anybody that had ever crossed a border. He pointed out that many of the documents would still be classified, and accordingly not available through normal review.

Dr. Peterson expressed an interest in the format of the Border crossing document *[Propusk],* and the chain of events connected with a potential transfer.

General Zaporoshenko outlined *Propusk* procedures, and pointed out that the individual border unit would retain a copy of the document as well. He also stated that the archival retention period could range from 5 to 20 years of more, depending on the importance of the issue.

Congressman Johnson stressed that the transfers we were talking about would have been covert operations, not necessarily occurring within the constraints of normal cross-border operations. He cited the information provided by [former major] Avraham Shifrin as an example.

Session Summary

Colonel Orlov summarized the session's efforts as follows:

- The working group's efforts have been defined and made specific.

- There is no doubt that direct Soviet interrogations of American personnel occurred on both Chinese and Korean soil.

- There is no specific supporting evidence that transfers from the Korean Theater to the USSR took place.

- After acknowledging an extensive search of MVD, Security Services, and MOD archival assets, Orlov stated that the archival search would be broadened to include the Border Guards -- specifically to search for border crossing documents -- customs personnel, Air Forces, AAA, KGB and others.

- The witness testimony program would be expanded to include not only the conventional types of witnesses already being sought, but also 'veterans of the archives.'

Colonel Orlov brought up the topic of Colonel Derskiy, and expressed that he had considerable reservations with not only the substance, but also the manner of the interview. He pointed out that Derskiy could not speak English, and accordingly wondered how the interview Derskiy claims to have performed in Mukden [Shen Yang] was carried out.

General Zaporoshenko agreed that the summary was good, and that the archival search should be expanded. He pointed out that the documents concerning the 1961 [sic: 1960] incident of Francis Gary Powers were also first located in the Border Troops archives.

Mr. Kauzlarich agreed the sum nary was excellent, and stressed keeping the issue of potential transfer of American pilots to the USSR open. He pointed out that further refinement had brought down the list of likely survivor cases to 13. Only one new name had been added to the list [Davis]. This list was then passed to the Russian side.

Colonel Orlov opined that in many of these cases, it was doubtful that anything could be found, but that the Russian side would approach this task with renewed emphasis.

7 December, Session 1

The attendees for the first session of the Korean War Working Group on 7 December were the same as for the previous session, with the addition of Mr. Ed Ross, Acting DPMO, Mr. Mark Pekula, State Department, Ms. Carol Lozon, State Department, and SSgt Michael Groh, Task Force Russia, for the US side, and Colonel Mukhin, MOD archives, for the Russian side.

Following introductions, Dr. Peterson started a line of discussion concerning the procedure and process of filing interrogation reports within the archives. Colonel Mukhin interrupted Dr. Peterson to explain that he was not present at the previous session. In his statement, he categorically disagreed with Colonel Parr's [Task Force Russia] statements that the working groups had apparently ceased working after the last plenary. He had received answers to the US side's questions on 10 October, and was waiting for Colonel Parr to contact him. He did not receive an answer from Colonel Parr until 26 November. The limited time

did not permit a more satisfactory resolution of Colonel Parr's questions. With regard to Dr. Peterson's specific questions concerning the filing of interrogations, Colonel Mukhin stated that interrogations were filed chronologically by prisoner name. The interrogations were kept in clusters of 10 - 15, and were bundled with a letter of transmittal and a copy of the submitted list of questions. The transmittal letter was used to refer the interrogations to higher headquarters. All materials related to a single prisoner were kept together.

Dr. Peterson then queried how to obtain information on, for example, the Bach interrogation, through the card file. Colonel Mukhin, seemingly side-stepping the question, referred back to the Russian-provided list of 59, which represented extracts of archival holdings concerning interrogations. He stated that the letter of transmittal provided a consolidation of information to higher headquarters, but not the actual documents. Dr. Peterson asked whether in the case of extremely interesting material, the originals would not be sent to the highest political channels (i.e., Stalin). When this was acknowledged, she raised the issue of what would happen to a document once the higher headquarters or Stalin was done with it. Mukhin stated that it was probably returned to the Presidential Archives. Orlov confirmed this, pointing out that once it had been initialed by Stalin or Molotov, it was returned. Mukhin opined that if everything were to have been taken to the Kremlin, the paper would just accumulate.

Congressman Johnson queried Colonel Mukhin about [General] Kan San Kho as an example of the Korean Soviets currently residing in Central Asia. Major Hindrichs then provided information which showed that the Former Task Force Russia had indeed pursued the Korean - Soviet connection in Central Asia, and that it had been rebuffed on direct responses to its questions. The issue discussed by all participants concerned the sovereignty, or apparent lack thereof, of Korean actions during the war. Major Hindrichs pointed out that practically the entire political leadership and Korean General Staff held Soviet commissions, many of them dating from World War II. When this was disputed, Major Hindrichs provided the Soviet *curriculum vitae* on General Kan, which included long periods of service with the Red Army before finally moving to Korea. When the Russian side protested that these relationships were independent of each other, Major Hindrichs questioned the immediate manner in which a retiring Korean officer could suddenly change citizenship a second time.

Colonel Orlov opined that in any case, it would not have been possible for a Korean general officer to submit documents for inclusion in the Soviet archives.

General Zaporoshenko once again stressed the need to check the Border Guard archives. Dr. Peterson, as well as other members of the US side, expressed a desire to visit the Border Guard archives. General Zaporoshenko thought that this could be arranged through General Volkogonov, and also urged visiting the Ministry for Foreign Affairs archives.

In response to Colonel Orlov's request for procedures on how to achieve closure on some cases, Congressman Johnson stated that the US side required an unequivocal statement that to the best of the Russian side's knowledge, no American prisoners of war had ever been transferred to the Soviet Union. Colonel Orlov will look into this. and perform the task.

The US side then turned the topic to the Blagoveshchenskiy Group. Mukhin dismissively stated that no pilots or aircraft had been brought down by the Blagoveshchenskiy Group. Colonel Orlov then outlined the history of the Group, which was under the command of General-Major Blagoveshchenskiy, the former director of NII VVS [Scientific Research Institute of the Air Forces]. He quoted General Volkogonov that Blagoveshchenskiy was still alive, living in the Moscow area, and that it would be possible to meet with him. Colonel Orlov then described the mission of the Blagoveshchenskiy Group, painting it to be an aggressor squadron of 10 - 11 test pilots from the Institute sent to Korea to learn American tactics for the purpose of training. This was in direct response to the existing situation at the time:

- Korean ground forces were crossing the 38th Parallel towards Seoul

- Massive Chinese forces were crossing the Yalu

- US B-29 were inflicting major damage on the Yalu bridges with radio-controlled bombs.

After an initial flurry of activity in December 1950, the month the first F-86 wing arrived in Korea, an operational lull took place. With the renewed emphasis on bridge bombing in April 1951, F-86 activity intensified. The overwhelming air superiority enjoyed by the US Air Force forced the Soviets to act. Orlov stressed that the mission of the Group was not to bring down aircraft, as had been alleged in the 77 page study, but to practice and train US tactics. Orlov softened this adamant position somewhat after Major Hindrichs mentioned the Joint Commission Support Branch interview of the No. 2 Soviet ace of the Korean War, Colonel Yevgeniy Pepelyayev, who was also a regimental commander under Lobov and Belov. Pepelyayev had asserted that the force-down of an F-86 was indeed the mission of the Group, although it had failed in this endeavor. Orlov referred back to the Amirov interview, and pointed out the impossibility of forcing down an armed fighter aircraft. He did, however, stress that the F-86, like the MiG-15, a spin-off of the German-built Me-262, was a primary intelligence target. The primary items of interest to the Soviets at that time were the F-86 aircraft's electronic fit and the radar gun sight.

In response to Congressman Johnson's query on the success of the Group's mission, Orlov stated that the group was disbanded upon the opening of the second [Dandong area, Soviet forces] airfield at Miaogoi. He again disputed the alleged mission of the group.

Orlov continued that it would not have been necessary to force down the F-86s, since the long approach would have wasted considerable fuel. The MiGs would then engage the F-86s until they went "bingo" [out of fuel] and had to force land. Congressman Johnson, a veteran F-86 pilot from Korea, attested to the veracity of this observation. In several instances, pilots from his organization would shut down their engines and glide back to base. Orlov then stated that the US side had engaged in beaconing efforts against MiG-15s.

In a surprise statement, Orlov then stated that there was sufficient evidence that several F-86s were forced to land. He stated that they were 'of course brought here.' This information had been confirmed telephonically by [fnu] Waldenberg, Chief Test Pilot, and {fnu] Sergeev, Chief of the Design Bureau. These gentlemen had also confirmed to Orlov that the aircraft had indeed been there, albeit sanitized. Some persons had said that a pilot had accompanied the aircraft, but no one could describe him and no one had seen him first hand.

Major Hindrichs returned to the testimony of Colonel Pepelyayev, and discussed the 'renegade F-86' manifestation which had been reported by several Far Eastern Air Forces pilots during the war in addition to having been mentioned by Amirov.

Orlov, half-changing the subject, stated that when the Group was broken up, some of the pilots remained behind in the Dandong region to perform the training mission.

Questioned by Congressman Johnson on the success of capturing an F-86, Colonel Orlov stated that a minimum of two aircraft, one of which had landed in the sand flats off the Yalu, had been captured. These had been dragged into a tunnel, disassembled, and shipped back to the USSR.

Mr. Kauzlarich questioned the fate of the pilots of these two aircraft and requested any record of the numbers of the aircraft having been removed or changed at the design bureau. He also cited the names of Albert Tenney, shot down on 3 May 1951, and Deltis Fincher, shot down on 22 August 1952, as being likely candidates for these two aircraft. The beach force-down incident was then discussed in a four-way conversation. Major Hindrichs quoted Colonel Pepelyayev as having said that his technicians reported to him that the pilot of the aircraft which had landed in the sand flats had been picked up by a helicopter. This was a problem; the pilot was not recovered by the US side, and the Soviet side had no helicopters in Korea.

After a break, the topic was picked up again. Congressman Johnson pointed out that it is standard operating procedure to photograph every detail in a technical exploitation of an aircraft. These photographs and the technical exploitation records would have to survive in an archive somewhere.

Colonel Orlov proposed closing the topic of the Blagoveshchenskiy Group, and acknowledged that the mission of the Group was to force down F-86 aircraft. He did not know whether this mission was successful, but could affirm that a minimum of two aircraft had been brought to Moscow. He stressed again that no supporting evidence for the contention that pilots had been taken to the USSR had been found. The Russian side will continue to look for evidence.

The group then turned its attention on Colonel Derskiy. Mr. Kauzlarich discussed the circumstances of contact with Colonel Derskiy, a former Soviet officer who is now a citizen of Ukraine. Derskiy had alleged to have seen an order from GRU headquarters requesting an intact F-84 vis. F-86. In April 1951, an F-84 had been forced to land in a rice paddy. The pilot, wounded in the crash, had survived. The physical description of the pilot, mentioned by Derskiy to have been a Captain from Texas, and the circumstances of loss, matched those of Captain Thomas Helton, an MIA. The US was therefore interested in Russian follow-up. The US was also interested in any information on the captivity of General Dean, who had also been mentioned by Derskiy. Finally, Mr. Kauzlarich deferred to Major Hindrichs for additional information on the Derskiy subsources.

Major Hindrichs passed digital copies of photographs of American prisoners of war provided by LtCol Bandurko, a AAA liaison officer from Korea who had provided specific data on two shoot downs. The Russian side accepted the photographs and the descriptions of the losses without further comment.

Colonel Mukhin criticized the Derskiy interviews, and expressed sympathy for the US side having to listen to this drivel. Colonel Orlov then stated that too much information Derskiy provided was not corroborated, which cast doubts on the authenticity of the related information. Mukhin rejected the notion that Derskiy had interrogated anybody in English in Mukden, because Derskiy could not speak English. Orlov listed a number of small contradictions in Derskiy's testimony, and again chastized the interviewer for having ignored the who, what, when, where, and why of the interview. Orlov did qualify his rejection, by saying that there were many cases of the rules having been bent and broken.

The session disbanded abruptly for lunch, since the reception at Spaso House was to take place at 12:00 noon.

7 December, Session 2

The attendees for the second session of the Korean War Working Group on 7 December were the same as for the initial session, with the exception of Colonel Mukhin for the Russian side, who had departed.

After an initial suggestion by Colonel Orlov to move right into the summary, Mr. **Kauzlarich** requested follow-up on a few issues.

Major Hindrichs discussed the case of Lt Jack Erving Harding, whose interrogation was provided by the Russian side, but who did not archivally exist in the United States. He requested additional information from Russian sources.

In response to the Russian side's repudiation of Derskiy's testimony, Major Hindrichs pointed out that a minimum of five pilots had been held, as war criminals in Mukden until well after the war. Some of the officers there did wear Chinese uniforms. If one were to substitute the term 'F-86' for 'F-84' in Derskiy's testimony, much of it would make sense.

Colonel Orlov stated that the approach to witness testimony had to be more balanced; one would have to find more corroboration for allegations made. In a series of side comments, Orlov confused Harding [above] with 'Harvey,' and stated that he had been assured by Colonel Herrington [formerly Task Force Russia] that this person did not exist and accordingly did not have to be traced. He likewise extended this to 'Black,' but retracted this immediately. He furthermore rejected the Derskiy argument because of date discrepancies, and considers it to be less than satisfactory.

Dr. Peterson asked about the location of the archival fond concerning air operations in Korea. Mukhin

affirmed that this was in Podol'sk. Colonel Orlov continued, and stated that the fond of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps [parent unit for air operations Korea] was located in Podol'sk, but that other organizations such as the MVD, KGB, and others could have this information. General Lezhnikov discussed, in general terms, the division of records at the time of the 1954 divorce between the KGB and the GRU. He stressed that there may be additional areas within the KGB archives worthy of checking. Dr. Peterson expressed happiness that the documents from the 64th are now declassified, and requested Colonel Parr and Task Force Russia be given access to them. The US side would prefer seeing the original documents rather than the laboriously compiled extracts which don't answer the mail. Orlov did not think that this would be a problem, and will do his best to arrange it.

Final Summary

Colonel Orlov proposed the following summary of the Korean War Working Group's efforts:

The Russian side admits that there were Soviet-conducted direct interrogations of American servicemen on the territory of North Korea and of China during the period of the Korean War. These interrogations were recorded in protocols, some of which have been provided to the US side, but many of which seem to be missing. It is possible that additional protocols exist in the archive system, and the Russian side will pursue this line of inquiry.

The working group has determined that one of the missions of the special group commanded by General-Major Blagoveshchenskiy was to force down F-86 aircraft. Whereas some aircraft were forced to land, we do not know whether this was resultant to the efforts of this group. Multiple witnesses have allowed the group to determine that at least two aircraft were brought to Moscow. We have learned from pilots that in one case, an aircraft was taken apart, placed into a container, and taken to the Soviet Union.

Despite the existence of second- and third-hand reporting on the transfer of pilots to the Soviet Union, there is no direct archival evidence which has yet been found on such a transfer having taken place.

With regard to the evidence provided by Colonel Derskiy, many of his statements have not been confirmed. This leads the Russian side to doubt the rest of the information he provided, but the Russian side will check out in detail everything he has said. As of this time, there is no direct evidence of US pilots having been transported to the territory of the Soviet Union.

Proposals for Future Work

Colonel Orlov suggested reducing the number of questions being serviced while at the same time expanding the scope of the work. He stressed that it was necessary to widen the archival scope of the research, and at the same time, increase our requirements for witness experience. Interviews with witnesses were to be conducted in such a manner as to provide confirmation for data from other sources. Those witnesses who could not provide first-hand confirmation should be excluded.

Closer cooperation between Task Force Russia and the Russian side was also urged.

Mr. Kauzlarich stressed the need for the Russians to provide information on how to involve the Chinese and the Koreans themselves. Orlov was only able to address those Koreans who lived in the former Soviet Union. Mr. Kauzlarich provided some details of the recent interchange with the Koreans, during which several sets of remains were repatriated.

Mr. Kauzlarich requested design bureau personnel access, and Colonel Orlov believed that such access would be afforded to Colonel Parr.

Mr. Kauzlarich requested access to the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps records in Podol'sk for Colonel Parr. Colonel Orlov could not affirm this himself, because this was the purview of Colonel Mukhin. He explained some of the reluctance on the part of the intelligence, military, and scientific communities to be releasing documents to the US on a regular basis, because the US would publish unevaluated forms of the

documents. He cited the Mandra case, a Washington Post article by Ed Artis, and the "735" document. These cases made Russian archivists very concerned about releasing any information, and would result in a return to a system of cautiousness barring a change in the US attitude.

Conclusion of session

[Major Hindrichs / Executive Secretariat / 284-0941]

Minutes of the Vietnam War Working Group 7th Plenary Session of the USRJC Moscow, Russia, 6-7 December 1993

The Vietnam Working Group met December 6-7 in Moscow. The U.S. side was led by Congressman Pete Peterson; the Russian side by Vladimir Petrovich Kozlov, Deputy Director of the Russian archives and Russian Deputy Co-chairman of the Joint U.S.-Russia Commission on POW/MIAs.

Congressman Peterson led off the Working Group discussion by briefly reviewing the Vietnam-related accomplishments of the Joint Commission. Those accomplishments included President Yeltsin's October 1992 announcement that no U.S. POWs were being held against their will on the territory of the former Soviet Union; productive interviews with Russian diplomatic and military personnel and veterans who served in Vietnam and archival research leading to the discovery of the "1205" and "735" documents.

Peterson noted that we had completed the relatively easy part of our work; the Working Group had made an excellent start but we needed to dig deeper. He suggested that the working group discussions focus on the following: (1) archival research; (2) Soviet access to U.S. POWs held by Vietnam during the Vietnam War; (3) Task Force Russia (TFR) access to museums and technical institutes having captured U.S. equipment to include interviews with technical staff; and (4) the possible transfer of U.S. POWs to the former USSR.

Kozlov agreed with this approach and said the Russian side was prepared to provide answers to some of the questions the U.S. had sent the Russian side through the TFR Moscow office.

Before addressing the questions, Kozlov said that he was not completely satisfied with the accomplishments of the Vietnam Working Group. He noted that our extensive research had produced few tangible results. For example, recently completed searches of the Center for the Preservation of Contemporary Documentation (formerly the Archive of the General Department of the Communist Party -the Party's working files since 1950) and the Presidential Archive (formerly the Politburo Archive) had revealed no further information on U.S. POWs in Vietnam. Kozlov observed that these files had contained only political information not directly related to POW/MIA issues, but he was hopeful that what had been discovered would bring us closer to more worthwhile information. He also suggested that the Joint Commission should expand its archival research efforts to include regional files and records. Congressman Peterson said he shared Kozlov's concerns about the results of our archival research and agreed that the Joint Commission might usefully begin to look at regional archival holdings.

Kozlov said that he intended to pass to the U.S. side the following day (December 7) excerpts from the seven volume study on U.S. combat activities in Vietnam, entitled "Aggression of the USA in South East Asia." The study describes U.S. military activities in Indochina from 1964 to 1977 and contains an analysis of U.S. combat tactics. Kozlov indicated that the GRU representative would provide more details on the study later in the Working Group discussions.

PVO Textbook: Kozlov said the Russian side had been unable to locate the PVO textbook entitled: "Beyond the Borders of the Motherland." This work reportedly describes the experiences and activities of Russian air defense personnel in Vietnam. Kozlov indicated the search for the PVO textbook would continue.

Kozlov said that the Ministry of Interior (MVD) had conducted a namecheck on three names TFR-Moscow had given the Russian side. Peterson recalled that we had sent TFR-Moscow instructions to

request namechecks on thirteen names. He said that in view of this communication breakdown we would provide the complete list of thirteen names at the next day's working group meeting.

Kozlov said he was unsure about the U.S. request for additional information on the "1205" document from the Central Committee Archive. He asked for further clarification on what precisely the U.S. wanted. (U.S. side provided an explanation which follows during the next day's discussion, see below.)

Kozlov said the Russian side had been unable to locate the annual and quarterly reports which Soviet Air Defense personnel in Vietnam reportedly prepared. He noted that since Soviet military advisors were in Vietnam, by logic the reports should exist and should be in the Air Defense (PVO) archives. Kozlov said that he had already sent a request to Air Defense officials requesting that they locate the reports. Peterson suggested the adviser reports might also be found in Ministry of Defense archives; that the reports might have been distributed to other relevant ministries. Kozlov said he couldn't say definitely where the reports might be located; only that they were not in the archives searched to date.

Kozlov said that it would be possible for the U.S. side to visit the PVO museum in Bryansk. (U.S. side followed up on this later in discussion; see below.)

Kozlov reported that the Russian side had contacted Major Amirov on our behalf and had requested an interview. Amirov, however, had turned down the request, saying that when he met previously with foreign journalists they had quoted him incorrectly; this in turn had generated rumors.

Kozlov said the Russian side had examined the alleged Khabarovsk KGB paper and had concluded it was a fraud. (Note: This refers to a "letter" that a walk-in passed to TFR-Moscow. In February 1993 we gave a copy of the letter to the Russian side and requested their comments. The letter dealt with Korean War era POWs.)

Kozlov said that as a historian he was interested in this document. Consequently, it was important to know who might have prepared and/or translated it. Mazurov added that the Soviet intelligence services had their own operational language; this document he contended was the work of an "illiterate" Russian.

Kozlov observed that the issue of the Kuban Cossack Host of Krasnodar had become quite complex. He said the Cossacks had created their own archive. The Cossacks, Kozlov contended, were jealous of their prerogatives and had not been cooperative. Consequently, he was trying to go through the Cossack Committee and the Russian Archivist Society to obtain Kuban Cossack cooperation. (U.S. side sought further clarification on this issue later in Working Group discussions; see below.)

Kozlov reported that Yuri Ilynikh had been killed in an accident (unexplained) September 28, 1993. The Russian side had spoken with Ilynikh's widow and she had told them the American aviator's helmet was not at their home nor had she ever seen it. (TFR has informed us that they have had several meetings with Ilynikh and that, despite repeated requests that he bring the helmet, he has never produced it.)

Kozlov said there had been a meeting of CIS archivists in Moscow in October and that he had given a speech in which he had touched on the U.S. POW issue. During the meetings, there were discussions about the issue of repressed persons. Archivists from Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, and Kazakhstan had participated in the conference and had drafted an agreement which provided for mutual cooperation in efforts to determine the fate of missing persons. Kozlov was hopeful the agreement would be approved by all the conference participants early next year.

Congressman Peterson asked about the press reports concerning Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev trip to Vietnam in October. Kozyrev was reported as saying that the Russians would clear with the Vietnamese documents which related to the American POW issue. Kozlov and Mazurov stated that they were not responsible about what Ministry of Foreign Affairs might say in the course of international relations work. Kozlov pledged that POW related documents would be passed to the U.S. side.

Kozlov then called on GRU representative, Aleksandr Sivets, to present his finding on the seven-volume

study the GRU prepared on the U.S. military in Vietnam for the period 1964 to 1977. Sivets said the report, which was entitled "Aggression of the USA in South East Asia," contained an analysis of U.S. combat activity during the Vietnam War. He indicated that it contained several descriptions of air combat in which some U.S. planes were shot down. Sivets noted that in some cases the date and place of the incidents were included; in several instances there also were notations that the pilot had been captured.

Sivets then made some comments on the GRU's participation in the Joint Commission and the operational conditions the GRU experienced in Vietnam. He noted that it probably was hard for the U.S. side to believe that the GRU had never worked with U.S. POWs during the Vietnam War. However, he had read all the relevant documents and had found nothing to indicate GRU involvement with American POWs. He asserted that U.S. POWs were not part of the GRU's mission in Vietnam and that working with the Vietnamese was difficult and Soviet movement restricted. Last year the Russian side had passed the U.S. a report which illustrated the working environment in Vietnam. Sivets claimed the Chinese had more influence with the Vietnamese than the Russians, but he indicated that there was no information to suggest that the Chinese had access to U.S. POWs in Vietnam.

Congressman Peterson asked if the information developed on the combat actions in the GRU study had been prepared through questionnaires or provided by the Vietnamese to their Soviet advisors. Sivets replied that the information had come from both the Vietnamese and Soviet advisors located in-country. He characterized this as "unofficial channels."

Vyacheslav Mazurov, the Foreign Intelligence Service representative, asked whether the U.S. had passed the list of 510 names given by the Russian side to TFR to North Korea or the Vietnamese. Peterson observed that we had little or no contact with the North Koreans, but our bilateral relations with the Vietnamese continue to improve.

Peterson, noting Russia's historical relationships with North Korea and Vietnam, suggested the Russian government might be in a better position to ask these questions. Mazurov, however, replied that at this time, Russian relations with North Korea were not much better than the U.S.; he also believed that neither China nor Vietnam was inclined to discuss the POW issue with Russian officials. Mazurov stated that it would be better if the U.S. had North Korea and China at the table; there would be fewer meetings and more results.

Turning to the MVD representative, Aleksandr Maksimovich Shubin, Kozlov asked for an update on three names passed by TFR to the Russian side. Shubin stated that the results of the name checks were negative. Filinov, Holland, and Peterson were not Americans. In response to Peterson's explanation that we had sent thirteen names to be checked, Shubin replied that he had received only three. (The following day the U.S. side passed the Russians a list of thirteen names in both Russian and English script and requested the MVD to run a namecheck.) The U.S. side suggested that when conducting the namechecks it would be useful for the MVD to provide for each individual the dates of birth and death and, where possible, physical descriptions and characteristics, not just nationality.

Kozlov then initiated a brief discussion of what it might take for the Joint Commission to come to closure. He observed that in the case of World War II, we had expended a great deal of effort. Nevertheless, the picture still was not completely clear. Accordingly, we might soon face similar realities in the case of Vietnam, Korea, and the Cold War. We need to select criteria upon which both sides can agree, otherwise the Joint Commission could continue forever. The American side, Kozlov contended, needs to develop criteria which define the actions needed to bring the Joint Commission to closure.

Peterson explained that the U.S. side had a responsibility to the American people to obtain the fullest possible accounting for American servicemen. As a result, the U.S. side would have to insist that we investigate all credible leads and that we make every effort to extract as much POW/MIA-related data as possible from the archives of the former USSR. Peterson indicated that it might not be possible for us to reach full closure. He said his personal assessment of the post-Joint Commission period envisioned a bilateral agreement to continue U.S. and Russian cooperation on this important humanitarian mission.

Kozlov replied that the real answers to outstanding U.S. POW/MIA questions were not in Russia but rather Vietnam and Korea. Mazurov added that it was important that the U.S. understand that Russia was not hiding anything.

Peterson said the U.S. side of the Joint Commission was working to ensure that Russia received credit for its contributions to the work of the Joint Commission. He observed that U.S. attitudes toward Russia had improved during the last two years and that a contributing factor was the cooperation we had received in the Joint Commission. A key indicator of this cooperation was the willingness of Russian intelligence services to provide information. A critical factor in the future success of the Joint Commission, though, will be Russia's eventual declassification of POW/MIA related documents. When members of the Russian side visit the U.S. (tentatively set up for mid-February), the American side plans to show them the declassification process the U.S. government has undertaken for POW/MIA related material as well as the systems we have established to ensure that the American people have easy access to this information. The declassification of these documents was a massive undertaking, but it was needed to satisfy the American people; they want to know.

Kozlov replied that he was generally familiar with U.S. declassification procedures and that he was pleased that Joint Commission activities had enhanced U.S.-Russian cooperation.

Kozlov said it was difficult to understand why Americans would continue to think that Russia was hiding information on U.S. POWs. He explained that Russia recently had admitted the murder of 20,000 Polish officers in Katyn Forest during World War II--an atrocity which had affected the lives of millions of people. Was it possible that any American could believe that Russia would conceal what it knows about U.S. POWs?

Peterson observed that many Americans searching for missing loved ones have never made the comparison to losses suffered by other countries. An underlying cause of this might be that we have not done a good job of explaining our accomplishments to the American public. It is a problem we (the U.S. government) will have to address.

Kozlov, recalling the U.S. side's early public release of the "735" document in the aftermath of the September 1993 meeting, suggested that since expert analysts had concluded that the number of U.S. POWs was incorrect, the U.S. should not have made the contents of the report public. He contended that U.S. release of the "735" document had caused journalists to discredit the Joint Commission's work through negative commentary.

Peterson replied that not releasing the "735" document would have been the very worst approach, because it would have fueled mistrust among the American people. In a democratic society, it is far better to make such information public as soon as possible.

Vietnam Working Group (Morning - December 7)

The U.S. side opened the working group session by presenting an analysis of the archival sources of the Vietnam-related documents we have received since the establishment of the Joint Commission. The analysis showed that the number of Vietnam-era documents was relatively small when compared to those of other wars; that none had come from security service archives; and that many had no notations to indicate the archival source. Peterson stressed that the purpose of our presentation was to demonstrate areas where there might be opportunities for new archival research.

Mazurov protested that the analysis did not include documents which had been provided to the Joint Commission by the Foreign Intelligence Service. Peterson replied that Mazurov's complaint was precisely the problem we were trying to address; we had prepared this analysis to give the Vietnam Working Group a better indication of where we had obtained documents and to demonstrate the problems created by unidentified documents.

Mazurov contended that if the contributions of the GRU and the security services were not properly

accounted for, these organizations would be blamed for the Joint Commission's lack of progress. Sivets, the GRU representative, added that it was only logical that GRU files should contain little information on U.S. POWs in Vietnam, because it had no involvement with them and they were not part of the GRU mission.

Peterson underscored the positive purpose of the analysis and stressed that the discussion should not focus on blame. Speaking to Mazurov, he suggested that it was natural for citizens not to trust intelligence services; it is the nature of their business. Peterson added that if our analysis was incorrect we would be pleased to receive information verifying archival sources so that we could properly identify all the documents the Russian side had given us. He noted that the analysis had also pointed up some important research opportunities the working group would want to address (e.g. the Ministry of Defense archives and those in Gatchina and Podolsk). Peterson urged the GRU to dig deeper into its files for POW/MIA related information

The U.S. side stressed the importance of understanding the Russian side's research approach. Demonstrating that every possible step is being taken to locate information relevant to U.S. POWs will be a critical factor in establishing the credibility of Joint Commission findings and conclusions. Peterson also requested the Russians to use greater initiative in their archival research efforts, observing that the Russians knew best the location and contents of their documents. The GRU representative, for example, had provided a great service to the Joint Commission by locating and reviewing the seven-volume GRU study on U.S. combat activity in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War. The recent discoveries of the n 1205" and "735" documents showed that although there was tension in the bilateral working relationship, there was significant contact between Russians and their Vietnamese counterparts.

The Russians stressed that information contained in the "1205" and "735" documents and the GRU study was received through "unofficial" channels. Sivets again underscored that it was not the objective of the GRU to track the fate of U.S. POWs. He claimed it would take time to determine what information might be contained in GRU archives; Sivets expressed the view that if any U.S. POW/MIA information was found in GRU holdings, it would be minimal. Further, he indicated that the transfer of the n 1205" and "735-- documents had caused relations with Vietnam to become more difficult. Nevertheless, he would convey the U.S. side's requests to his superiors. He also pledged to continue his research and to expand the search for relevant archival information to regions outside Southeast Asia. Peterson expressed appreciation for GRU efforts.

Mazurov, noting the absence of the CIA on the Joint Commission, insisted that U.S. POWs were of little interest to Russian intelligence services. Imagine, he said, recruiting a guy named John; if he doesn't feed you information he is a liability--no information--no money. Most POWs (95 percent) were of little interest to the intelligence services. Mazurov asserted the CIA thoroughly checked persons who were in our (Soviet) hands even a short time; attempts to recruit such individuals would not have been worth the potential costs.

Peterson recalled that Nechiporenko had talked to one U.S. POW; what was the purpose of this contact? Mazurov immediately countered by asking what a U.S. POW, who was a Soviet specialist, was doing in Southeast Asia. Intelligence specialists, Mazurov argued, did not generally change areas of focus. Peterson replied that in the U.S. we did not get locked into single specialties. During the Vietnam War, for example, there were carrier pilots flying missions over Vietnam who were slated for astronaut training. Similarly, employees of civilian foreign affairs agencies do not always focus on a single specialty or geographical area.

Peterson recalled that during the September meeting, the Russian side had insisted that no analysis had been prepared on the "1205" document; was any analysis prepared on the "735" document?

Kozlov replied that intelligence analysis was beyond the scope of the Joint Commission; he acknowledged that it could have been ordered, but no such analysis of the "735" document had been located to date.

Peterson explained that when we found the 1205 document there were 28 other documents co-located with it that we had asked to see. General Volkogonov had ordered these documents to be reviewed and declassified. We had hoped they would be released during the April 1993 plenary but to date we had not received them. Kozlov said that the Russian side had given TFR-Moscow the documents in question in September. Peterson replied that we would check on this matter further and instruct TFR-Moscow to meet with the Russian side to identify the documents.

Kozlov said he had two matters which he believed should be of interest to the Joint Commission. He recalled that at the September 1992 Joint Commission meeting, the U.S. side had interviewed an Ministry of Foreign Affairs official named Anatolii Voronin. At that time, arrangements were made for TFR-Moscow to see the plans of Ho Chi Minh's tomb; plans which revealed there was no prison located in the substructure. During the same interview, Voronin indicated that a diary account of the day's events was prepared daily by Soviet personnel in Hanoi for the Central Committee. (During the interview, Voronin said that after visiting Hanoi in February 1965, Kosykgin issued oral instructions that the Soviet government keep a daily diary of events in Vietnam. Voronin said one copy went to the MFA, a second to the Department of the Praesidium and a third to Kosygin himself. Voronin insisted that the diaries contained nothing on the transfer of U.S. POWs to the former USSR.)

Kozlov said the Russian side had tried without success to find a copy of the diary. He claimed there was evidence the diary still existed but in the 1960s, parts of it might have been destroyed. The diary was prepared by the Vietnam section of the Central Committee and used in operational planning. Kozlov said it might be in the Center for the Preservation of Contemporary Documentation which is currently being reworked. This reorganization, unfortunately could take as long as two years to complete. Kozlov said the material is stored in several rooms; it is not indexed, because the documents were taken from Central Committee files. Kozlov said he was interested in the diary because, although it would not address the fate of individuals, it could give the historical context of the period and provide leads for additional research.

Peterson observed that we had a number of questions to ask regarding the status of certain Vietnam-related activities. Some of these questions might be redundant, but we wanted to develop an inventory on where we stand. He then asked the status of efforts to locate cables sent to and from Soviet embassies. Kozlov replied that this search had been completed and had revealed no information on U.S. POW/MIAs. (Note: Within a special division of the MFA archives or AVPRF, Fond 59 contains enciphered cables.) The TFR-32 MVD center for Repression Rehabilitation has only World War II info. However. this was the area that was used to check the 3.752 POW/MIA list.

In response to the U.S. side's inquiry on the research status of POW files in Khabarovsk and Magadan, the MVD representative, Aleksandr Shubin, replied that he had found no information on U.S. POW/MIAs. He stated that the U.S. had already received a general statement from the MVD noting that all detention facilities had been checked. As regards the PVO archives, Kozlov said he did not know the condition of these archives. He suggested the research might be complicated if some of the units had been deactivated. Events of the last several years, Kozlov said, have been hard on Russian archives--many have been destroyed or privatized.

Peterson recalled that in the September 1993 meeting the Russian side had recommended that we again interview Nechiporenko and had agreed to try to arrange a meeting with Nechiporenko, Pankov, and with the newspaper's Kommersant journalist. Peterson said that in view of the Russian offer we would like to request that meetings be arranged.

Vietnam Working Group (December 7 - Afternoon)

Mazurov informed the working group that Nechiporenko was not at home and therefore could not meet with the working group. He said he would try to arrange a meeting with him for TFR. Mazurov stated that Nechiporenko was retired, out hunting and fishing, not waiting around by the phone.

Peterson observed that in September, both sides agreed that the Russian side would try to locate museums

and technical institutes where U.S. equipment captured in Vietnam and taken to the former Soviet Union might be stored and/or be displayed. We also had asked whether it would be possible to meet with technicians who might know the origins of the equipment and/or how it was transported to the former USSR.

Kozlov said he could arrange a visit for TFR-Moscow to the PVO museum in Bryansk. Peterson, however, suggested that such equipment might have been shipped to a number of locations. Kozlov replied that with the exception of Bryansk he had been unable to locate other museums or institutes. He said he was attempting, through archivist channels, to contact institutes, such as the Center for Space Documentation, to determine whether they had any U.S. equipment.

Peterson explained that finding the F-1 11 capsule at the Moscow Aviation Institute and obtaining relevant identification numbers had provided additional information on one of our cases. Kozlov said he could ask Moscow Aviation Institute officials whether they knew where any other captured U.S. military equipment from Vietnam might be kept. Peterson stressed again the potential importance of obtaining serial numbers and underscored the value of meeting with knowledgeable technicians.

Peterson, recalling the use of interrogation questionnaires in the Korean War and statements by General Abramov in the current plenary session, reiterated the U.S. side's interest in obtaining questionnaires which might have been used in Vietnam. Peterson stressed that our intent was not to obtain the substance of the reports but rather the name of the persons questioned and the date the interrogation occurred. Kozlov replied that the Russian side would continue to search for the questionnaires.

Peterson asked Kozlov to review once again the situation regarding documents in the possession of the Kuban Cossack Host. Kozlov recounted that the Russian side had tried to contact the Cossack unit in Krasnodar, but they did not fully understand the nature of the Russian request and furthermore considered their archive to be private property. Kozlov said he could not conceive of an archive in Russia that was not open to the public. He said he was taking steps to press the Cossacks to open their archival holdings.

Kozlov, after hearing about TFR-Moscow's unsuccessful efforts to verify that former American POWs were buried in Krasnodar, suggested that the working group needed to make inquiries at the Ministry of Interior. Kozlov said he would help TFR-Moscow get access to the cemetery book in Krasnodar, noting that obtaining the birth date and date of death for each of the alleged Americans would be important.

Peterson then turned to the question of archival information on the Committee on Asian African Solidarity, recalling that in September the Russian side had agreed to search for possible information. Kozlov replied that the Committee had been disbanded and that its files had been distributed to two archives--the Archives of Science and Technology and an archive located on the site of the Committee's office. Kozlov said he would continue his search for information on this organization.

Peterson asked for clarification on developments at the CIS archivist conference in Moscow in October. He suggested the U.S. POW issue might be included in the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) that Kozlov earlier said was being reviewed. Kozlov explained that the MOA was a general document which addressed the issues of missing persons in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and correcting social injustices against repressed peoples; information on POWs consequently would fall within the framework of the MOA. Kozlov said the CIS countries generally are asserting their independence; for example, Ukraine had just demanded that file cards on POWs detained in Ukraine be transferred from Russia. Similarly, when Russia tried to solicit POW information on behalf of Poland from Belarus and Ukraine, they were told that the Poles should make the bilateral contacts themselves. Kozlov said Russian insistence on the inclusion of a U.S. POW clause might be seen by CIS countries as a Russian attempt to dominate the forum.

Peterson repled that perhaps the best way to proceed would be for the U.S. to contact these countries directly and to keep the Russian side informed of developments. Kozlov said that when we approached their archivists we should stress that Russia's intent in this matter was to assist and not to dominate.

Peterson then asked if the Russians had located any information that might have been co-located with files describing the transfer of U.S. Vietnam-era deserters to Western Europe via the USSR. Kozlov replied that such matters would have been addressed by the General Secretariat--the highest level in the Soviet government hierarchy. The only records which he had found involved the transit of U.S. deserters.

Peterson observed that we might have given the Russian side too large a task. We know that in 1968 and 1970 there were early releases of U.S. POWs by Vietnam and that they returned to the U.S. through Moscow. Peterson asked whether we could provide the Russian side with the names of the POWs released early and have the appropriate files checked to determine how these POWs might have transitted the USSR. He added that we would attempt to give the Russian side as much information on these releases as possible; that we would try to help narrow the search. (Note: Four U.S. defectors transitted Moscow in 1968. One U.S. POW transitted Moscow in 1970 and three more in 1972. Several other POWs were released prior to Operation Homecoming in 1973 but they did not go through Moscow.)

Mazurov, in a closing comment, said that the security services would not have used the POWs because it would have caused trouble with U.S.

Plenary Session

MFA/Vietnam Agreement

During the opening Plenary Session on December 6, Ambassador Toon raised the issue of the reported agreement between the Russian MFA and Vietnam. According to press reports, the MFA agreed that no documents would be released to the U.S. side of the Joint Commission until they were first reviewed by the Vietnamese.

In response to Ambassador Toon's request for clarification, General Volkogonov said the release of the documents was his decision as co-chairman of the Joint Commission; that he did not have to check such decisions. Volkogonov also reassured Toon that the Russian side of the Joint Commission would continue to provide POW/MIA-relevant documents as they were declassified.

Visit of Russian Working Group Chairman

During the plenary session, Ambassador Toon invited the Chairmen of the Working Groups and their Deputies to visit the U.S. for follow-up talks. The prospective timeframe for the visit is mid-February. The Russians accepted the proposal.

Conclusions of Vietnam Working Group

Russian side passed to the U.S. side relevant pages from the GRU study on U.S. military activities in Indochina.

U.S. side agreed to have the Task Force Russia Moscow office check and list the archival source of documents passed to TFR in September by the Russian side of the Joint Commission. These documents are declassified material that was co-located with the Tran Van Quang (1205) document.

Russian side agreed to follow-up with PVO archives requesting location and access to annual and quarterly reports prepared by air defense advisers in Vietnam.

Russian side agreed to attempt to arrange interview by TFR personnel of Oleg Nechiporenko as suggested by the Russian side in September.

Russian side stated it would continue to search for the Vietnam diary prepared for the Central Committee.

Russian side agreed to accomplish a namecheck of the 13 names we passed them during the Vietnam Working Group meeting.

Russian side stated it would continue its research of GRU files for POW/MIA-related material.

The Russian side stated that the Russian State Archive would expand research to regional files under its control.

Russian side agreed to assist Task Force Russia in obtaining further information on Vietnam-era Americans reportedly buried in Krasnodar.

Russian side agreed to assist Task Force Russia in obtaining access to museums and technical institutes having captured American equipment; where possible, Russian side will attempt to arrange interviews for TFR personnel with technical personnel who might know origin of the equipment and the circumstances by which it was acquired.

In its negotiations with the archivists of Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhastan, and Ukraine, Russian side stated it would urge that information relating to U.S. POWs be passed to the Joint Commission, and will convey U.S. requests for such information to the archivists of these former Soviet republics.

TFR will coordinate with the Russian side the source-labelling by archive of all documents passed over the last two years in order to accurately reflect efforts of all archives.

The Russian side stated that it would continue to search for Vietnam War questionnaires referred to by General Abramov.

The U.S. side agreed to provide the Russian side with as much information as possible on the transit through Moscow of U.S. POWs released early by Vietnam. This information is intended to assist the Russian side's review of transportation manifests.

Minutes of the Closing Plenary Meeting 7th Plenary Session of the USRJC Moscow, Russia, 6 - 8 December 1993

This session convened at 10 A.M. on 8 December 1993, Il'yinka 10, Moscow.

This session was opened by the Chairman of the Russian side, Colonel General Dmitri Volkogonov.

Volkogonov: Distinguished Mr. Ambassador Toon, distinguished colleagues. Let's continue our work. Today, we would like to hear the reports from the heads of the working groups of the Russian and American sides. We must also finalize the schedule for our future work. There will be a press conference at 12 o'clock. The press conference won't be here in this hall, but it will be nearby: at the Government Press Center about 50 meters away at entrance number 7. I suggest that not everyone go to the press conference since we have a gentleman here who has studied the camp system for 10 years. Some of you would probably like to stay here to listen to his report. He is a knowledgeable specialist on camps and prisons. It would be a good idea to outline our future work and then listen to him.

Toon: Most of us will stay here. It might be more useful for us to listen to him than to attend the press conference.

Volkogonov: I'm not worried about myself, but you'll be in trouble. You will have a harder time when you get back to the States.

Toon I'm used to it.

Volkogonov: I think that the meetings yesterday and the day before yesterday regarding certain aspects of the Korean War, Vietnam War, and Cold War periods showed that it is extremely important at this point to deal with eyewitnesses and people who took part in one incident or another.

Moreover, we do not believe that the archival work is completed. I think that one of the congressmen

correctly stated that perhaps the most difficult stage of our work is now upon us. It is now necessary to work on giving final answers to this or that case.

Also, it is obvious to every one of us that we are not only capable of saying nice words to one another, but that we are also capable of sharply disagreeing and arguing. This is a completely normal method of working. I thank Ambassador Toon who set the tone, so to say, a good working tone, and I think that this enriches the work of the Joint Commission.

Now, I suggest the following agenda for today's work: First, the heads of the Russian side of each working group will speak, followed by the heads of the American side. We will still have some time and perhaps there will be some corrections or additions made since there are two hours to work. If Ambassador Toon does not object, then we propose this procedure for today's work.

Toon: Sounds very good.

Volkogonov: Let's start with the Korean War. Mr. Orlov, if you please.

Orlov: Distinguished Ambassador Toon, distinguished General Volkogonov, distinguished commission members. During the three sessions from yesterday and the day before yesterday, the Korean War working group discussed those issues which had been outlined during the previous session. We concentrated mainly on three sets of issues.

First, there are the testimonies of eyewitnesses and reports of those who had heard something about Korean War American POWs being on the territory of the Soviet Union.

Second, there are the pilots, mainly F-86 pilots, and the work of the Blagoveshchenskiy group, which had the mission to force down an F-86 type aircraft. Thus, we discussed the fate of those pilots and that aircraft.

Third, there was Colonel Derskij's testimony that American POWs were transported to the USSR.

We did not look at the testimony of Colonel Malinin because the Co-Chairmen of our Commission personally took responsibility for this issue.

Now, the details.

Fifty years ago, at the Teheran Conference, Churchill said that during war 'truth' is such a valuable product that it is always accompanied by a bodyguard of lies. Concerning the Korean War, we also raked through a pile of lies while trying to find a grain of truth. It must be said that we ran across a great number of testimonies from people who were under, and are still under, the influence of that lie which existed during the war. Nevertheless, we managed to establish the following:

With the help of the U.S. side, we managed to reduce the number of F-86 pilots for whom we were searching from 31 to 13 persons.

We also established that there were some interrogations of American POWs, mainly pilots, by Soviet officers on Chinese and Korean territory.

There is also sufficiently reliable evidence that not less than two F-86 aircraft were transported to the Soviet Union; however, this evidence requires further verification.

As far as pilots and other prisoners are concerned, there is no direct evidence that they were transferred to the Soviet Union. Not a single case.

There is also no reliable information on the detainment of American POWs on Soviet territory, in camps or in any other like establishments.

As concerns the testimony of Colonel Derskij, it must be noted that much of his testimony is not trustworthy and is refuted by other evidence and documents. Therefore, doubt is raised concerning the remainder of his testimony. Nevertheless, we will continue to check his testimony.

Our proposal is such:

We must expand the number of archives in our search for documents which could be of interest to us. Apart from the archives of the Ministry of Defense, the Committee for State Security, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, apparently, we must also search the archives of the Border Troops, Customs, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is also necessary to expand the search for witnesses. Up to now, we have limited ourselves mainly to war veterans. However, I think that for this Commission, or specifically for our working group, we should look at veteran workers of the archives, those who worked in the archives at that time, museum workers, workers of the design bureaus and airplane factories, and other persons who may have had access to documents, evidence, or people that we are looking for. We also believe it necessary to improve cooperation between working groups: the American group in Moscow and the Russian side of the Commission in the period between sessions.

This is all that I have. Thank you for your attention.

Volkogonov: Perhaps there are some questions?... Thank you. Now, we would like Congressman Johnson to speak.

Johnson: Thank you Mr. Chairman. I believe Mr. Kauzlarich will present our side.

Kauzlarich: Thank you Mr. Chairman, colleagues. I do not have much to add to what Colonel Orlov so excellently summed up as to the results of our working group. But I do think there are a couple of points that might be helpful in amplifying some of the areas where we agreed to conduct some further work.

We were very pleased with the degree of cooperation and openness that the Russian side demonstrated during our three sessions. Particularly, the explanation regarding the Soviet officers who participated in interrogations of U.S. POWs in Korea and China. Here is an area where we believe there may be additional interrogation reports in other archives on the Russian side. Having access to those areas will be very important in helping us determine the fate of missing American POWs.

Second, on the evidence regarding the fact that not less than two F-86 fighter aircraft were transmitted to the USSR: We believe it will be especially important to have access to both the people and archives, including photographic archives, connected with the design bureaus, who might have exploited the information about those aircraft. And while there still is no direct evidence that pilots were transferred, we still believe, on the American side, that there is the possibility that American pilots of F-86 aircraft that are still missing were brought to the Soviet Union.

Concerning the testimony of Colonel Derskij, while there may still be different opinions about aspects of his testimony, we believe that it was particularly valuable that the Russian side agreed that we did need to continue to explore those facts which he has brought forward.

In terms of the future work that we agreed to conduct, I think one of the more valuable outcomes of our working group was the agreement that we needed improved coordination between working group sessions. Here we discussed two specific ways of accomplishing this: increased contacts here between Colonel Parr's group and the working group on Korea; and second, the invitation to have the head of the Russian working group come to the United States, perhaps around mid-February, to do some work with us.

Finally, the spirit of exchange was really quite remarkable because we both agreed on the humanitarian aspect of finding out the fate of American prisoners of war and we expressed to the Russian Side our continued willingness to follow-up on any additional cases of Soviet personnel who may be missing from that war as well.

Thank you very much.

Volkogonov: Thank you. Are there any questions?... Thank you.

Kauzlarich: Thank you again.

Volkogonov: We would now like to ask Professor Kozlov to report to us on the subject of the Vietnam War.

Kozlov: Thank you, General. I must emphasize that the Vietnam War working group is doomed to a certain ambiguity, because we do not proceed from specific facts, such as with the cases of the Cold War, but from hypotheses that some POWs may have been brought to the Soviet Union. Excluding the known cases which the Communist Party exploited for propaganda purposes, we are inclined more and more to believe that it is improbable that American citizens who participated in the Vietnam War were transferred to the Soviet Union.

Moreover, we appreciate more and more the scope of the approach of our U.S. colleagues in the search for American citizens, not only in the USSR, but in the search for any information on the fate of American citizens in China and elsewhere.

Without a doubt, it seems to us, we have good prospects for finding new facts in the Russian archives. In other words, we must exercise cautious optimism. I have in mind delicate situations which might arise when searching for documents in the archives. I have in mind that situation which arose with the two documents: the " 1205" and the "735" documents.

At the Vietnam War working group sessions, we had a fruitful exchange of opinions concerning the information which had been obtained earlier from the Russian archives. An important event in the working group session was when we handed over to the American side the document which deals with the combat operations and the shootdowns of American aircraft during the Vietnam War.

At the meeting, the Russian side informed their American colleagues of the steps taken in September 1993 on expanding and, at the same time, localizing the searches for archival documents and verbal evidence relating to the fates of Americans. This expanding and localizing, above all, relates to the Air Defense archives of the Soviet Union, and now Russia, as well as to the archives of the GRU, the Committee for the Solidarity of Asian and African Countries, other departmental archives, and also the state archives of the Krasnodar Kraj.

It seems to us that our American colleagues with interest, understanding, and compassion accepted the information on the search for the so-called 'Vietnam diary' and the established fact that portions of that diary were destroyed--portions which could have been useful in obtaining information on Americans in Vietnam.

The Russian side also took on the responsibility to take immediate steps on determining how the F-1 11 capsule got to the Moscow Aviation Institute and also on organizing a visit to the Air Defense museum in Bryansk.

In all aspects of our future work, we agreed to study the possibility that there was a technical questionnaire for the Vietnamese to use in interrogating American pilots.

Also, a number of questions were discussed which concerned the technique of our joint work and the criteria for a joint evaluation of the positive and negative results of our work. In this aspect, there are still significant prospects and untapped opportunities.

Thank you for your attention.

Volkogonov: Perhaps there are some questions?... Thank you. We would like to ask Congressman

Peterson to report.

Peterson: Thank you Mr. Chairman, colleagues. Mr. Kozlov's report was very thorough and I will try not to be redundant.

The Vietnam working group continued in its excellent cooperation and we continue to build on our personal relationships.

We're very pleased with the progress of this working group, understanding the difficult loads that our Russian commissioners have had at this time. I had the personal opportunity, with Mr. Kozlov, last night to see 48 tons of material which he is obligated to put through new archival processing. So his personal time has been strained; however, I have to give special praise to Mr. Kozlov for his enduring and very professional work in support of this working group.

I also want to mention Messrs. Mazurov and Sivets for their personal contribution to this working group's efforts at this time.

This working group was investigating four major topic areas. The overall objective was to clarify some of the confusing aspects of the previous working group.

1) We looked first at the work that we've accomplished within the archives,

2) Russian access to American POWs in Vietnam,

3) Russian access to and transportation of American captured equipment from Vietnam,

4) and examination of the possible transfer of American POWs to the former Soviet Union.

As Mr. Kozlov noted, the major accomplishment of this working group was clearly the exchange of the GRU document involving American combat operations in Vietnam. We look at this as a major breakthrough for the Vietnam working group.

During the working group, we presented to our Russian colleagues an analysis that we had conducted on all of the data that had been collected during the entire life of the Commission. The glaring result of that analysis is that we have received very little documentation with regard to the Vietnam War, a war in which the most recent data should be available. We suggested, and the Russian side agreed, that there remains additional searches to be done within the security, defense, and national archives, and other archives for Vietnam-related data.

We agreed on a number of items to be done during the break until our next working group session. Mr. Kozlov has covered those in detail and I will not repeat them. But we did note that it's important for our future work and for our progress assessment, that we continue to focus on access to archival materials, interviews with individuals that had direct relationships with the Vietnam battlefield or country during that time and the declassification process.

I, too, am very pleased that our Russian counterparts and Co-Chairs will visit America in the February time frame. We will work hard in the future to continue having personal contacts with our counterparts during the breaks between visits to Moscow.

That concludes my report.

Volkogonov: Thank you. Do we have any questions?... Then let's go to our third group. I would like General Krayushkin to make his report.

Krayushkin: Together with our American colleagues, we concentrated mainly on 10 American shootdown cases. I will refrain from giving an evaluation of our work and leave that opportunity to our American

colleagues.

Objectively, I must say that during the time which has elapsed since the last meeting, for each of these cases, new archival material and eyewitness testimony has been uncovered which has greatly assisted in clarifying the circumstances of the fate and deaths of aircraft crews. We have a sufficiently clear picture from our colleagues about what remains to be done. We discussed the steps to be taken.

It is still necessary to do additional work on each of these cases but, for the most part, we can concentrate on two or three shootdowns--in particular, those cases where the Soviet Side found the remains of pilots. This is especially necessary since the search conducted in various archives and the questioning of various officials, who could have had information and could have given eyewitness testimony as to the fate of the remains, did not yield positive results. Therefore, it seems to us that new searches and, above all, new eyewitness information are required. It seems that we have insufficiently exploited the opportunities in the archives of the Border Guard Troops. For example, concerning the shootdown of an American aircraft in the Barents Sea area in 1960, we believe that it is necessary to make an appeal through the local press to those who served on the fishing trawler that retrieved the remains of a pilot and to appeal to the local populace in order to find the burial site of the pilot. Perhaps Dmitri Antonovich Volkogonov and Mr. Malcolm Toon will consider the opportunity at today's press conference to give some attention to this incident.

Here are some general recommendations on our future work.

We consider it necessary to give more attention to the search for films and photos which could provide visual evidence as to the circumstances surrounding shootdowns. We must ask the Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense, as well as any other archives that are participating in this work, to give this work a high priority.

We must expand the use of eyewitness testimony in our future work. In particular, we gave our colleagues a list of 21 Russian citizens who may be able to give eyewitness testimony on individual shootdown cases.

If you agree, we could record on videotape the most important testimonies so that we could use them in our work both here and in the United States on television in order to inform people about the work of the Commission.

And finally, concerning not only Cold War cases but also Korean and Vietnam War cases, I believe that in those cases where everything is known, we could write joint statements. This will allow us to concentrate on those cases where not all the facts are known.

I would like to once again state that the Russian side is ready to do everything in cooperation with our U.S. colleagues, to move the work of the Commission forward.

If there are no questions, then I would like to thank you.

Volkogonov: No questions?... Thank you. Mr. Dennis Clift.

Clift: Thank you Mr. Chairman. General Krayushkin's report is excellent, accurate, and splendid testimony to the progress that we are realizing in the Cold War working group.

Given the humanitarian nature of our work, clearly the highlight of this session was the appearance of Mr. Vasily Saiko. From his eyewitness report, we not only know more about the fate of one of our pilots, we know more about the fate of the entire crew. It is in fact very pleasing to know that he came forward because of the announcements that are flowing from the work of this Commission.

As General Krayushkin said, we focused on the 10 specific cases before us. Building on the progress realized in the September session, we continue to receive documents that confirm the reporting of each of

these incidents to the highest levels of the Soviet Government.

We received an important report from the Ministry of the Interior on the special camps.

During our work we welcomed the offers of our Russian colleagues to research different archives, the archives of the Border Guards, more intensively, and to broadcast, as General Krayushkin said, in the Northern Fleet area, information that may help us in our work.

Looking to our future work, we have also welcomed the list of witnesses that has been provided to us and we will be following up on that list with Colonel Parr and his staff here in Moscow.

The U.S. side has underscored the importance that we attach to full access to the archives at Gatchina and Podolsk. This is of particular importance to us because it is in these archives that we believe, for example, that specific search and rescue reports from specific units may lie. These in turn help to determine the fate of the crews. Similarly, we expressed intense interest in receiving any photos on each of these incidents. We welcome their offer in this regard.

We look forward to the February meeting in Washington of the heads of the working groups and to the further work of the Commission. Thank you.

Volkogonov: Thank you. Are there any questions?... I believe Ambassador Toon wishes to say something.

Toon: General Volkogonov, I told you during our opening plenary that my remarks may have seemed a bit sharp to you and your colleagues. But I also told you that I can always speak honestly to you. In that same vein of frankness, I am pleased to inform you that I am quite pleased with the outcome of our meetings this week.

The reports we have just heard from the Russian and American working group chairmen clearly demonstrate that we have again accelerated the Joint Commission's progress. During our meetings in April and September of this year, I noticed a distinct increase in the openness and candor of our discussions. But I now see that our effectiveness has increased dramatically as a result of the cooperation fostered by our working groups. This was obvious from the remarks made by working group chairmen on both sides. The chairmen of your working groups have made some very useful suggestions as to how we should proceed from now on, and I think we should act on those recommendations.

Now a couple of specific points I'd like to make about developments over the past couple of days.

First, with regard to the appearance by Mr. Saiko. As I indicated at the press conference which we held, we had discussed this affair with the widow of Captain Dunham and she was very pleased indeed at that development. But she indicated deep concern over the whereabouts of Captain Dunham's remains. I would appreciate your help in proceeding to that area where Mr. Saiko said he was sure the body was buried in order to retrieve it. I hope that your people can work with Colonel Parr in arriving at a quick solution to this problem.

Now, Mr. Kozlov's reference to the infamous " 1205" and "735" documents: It reminded me again of your Foreign Minister's statement which caused such great concern in my country. My recollection is that he indicated to the North Vietnamese that no document concerning them would be turned over to us without their clearance. Now I was instructed before I came out here to seek clarification of this statement. As you know, I had hoped to have a meeting with Foreign Minister Kozyrev while I was here, but he was tied up with other things. So I hope that you will convey to him personally, General Volkogonov, our concern about what he said. But in any case, if I understood your position correctly, we should not be concerned about how it may impinge upon our work. I think you told me that any document that you find in your archives will be turned over to us if it concerns our particular focus - the POW problem - without any clearance by any governments. Is that correct?

Volkogonov: Yes.

Toon: Well that, as far as I'm concerned, constitutes the clarification that we sought and we need.

Our immediate task is now to ensure that the frank exchange of ideas enjoyed by our working group chairmen in recent days continues in the months to come. I think the remarks by the chairmen of our working groups on both sides have reflected agreement on that point. We understand from your comments during the opening plenary that Colonel Parr and the chairmen of the three Russian working groups will now be able to communicate directly. This will go a long way toward facilitating continued cooperation between researchers on both sides of the Commission, even when you and I are engaged in other matters. As my colleagues have already indicated, we also look forward to hosting the chairmen and deputy chairmen of the Russian working groups in Washington in mid-February.

I thank you for your pledge, General Volkogonov, to work out the remaining problems faced by Colonel Parr and his team in gaining appropriate access to POW-related information in the Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense at Podolsk and the Soviet Naval Archives at Gatchina. After hearing your statements on this point, I am confident that this problem will be resolved expeditiously. Meanwhile, I'm happy to see that the Ministry of Defense has been helpful in widening our access to the files that contain the information that we need.

Yesterday, I had a very useful meeting with First Deputy Minister of Security Stepashin. Mr. Stepashin impressed me as a man who shares our humanitarian objectives and who is worthy of our trust. He reiterated President Yeltsin's pledge to ensure that no doors are closed to our search for information on missing American military personnel. I look forward to working with Minister Stepashin and with General Krayushkin in coming months. Incidentally, Mr. Stepashin told me that you were his teacher and mentor for many years. So I told him that I hope that this will mean that he will reflect your general outlook and approach to the problems that we face. He assured me that he took the same attitude that you do.

Finally, General Volkogonov, I would like to reiterate that our humanitarian mission obligates both sides of the Joint Commission. I assure you of our continued commitment to pursuing all information on your missing Russian and former Soviet servicemen.

As you know, we discussed yesterday the timing of our next meeting. I think that we're in general agreement that it should be in Moscow in late March or early April. Depending, as always, on the availability of Congressman Peterson and Congressman Johnson. They are the men on the delegation who are really busy.

Also, I would like to mention the documents that were turned over from the GRU files to us yesterday. Instead of going to the ballet last night or the opera, I spent the whole evening reading these documents. I agree with both co-chairmen of the Vietnam working group that these should be very useful indeed in getting us the information that we need about our missing personnel. I hope that you will convey my gratitude to the GRU. I never had this sort of cooperation from the GRU in the past. We have changed.

Nagin [?]: And the Main Intelligence Directorate has never been thanked by the U.S. Government as well.

Toon: Thank you very much.

Volkogonov: Distinguished Ambassador Toon and colleagues, I would also like to express my ideas concerning the work of the Commission and plans for future work. As always, I would like to draw attention to the special candidness and frankness of Ambassador Toon. It's hard to believe that he was a diplomat because he is always so candid with his opinions.

Toon: Many people in my country feel the same way you do and there are many people who wonder how I got as far as I did. So do I, frankly.

Volkogonov: Perhaps, you are a completely new type of diplomat, a diplomat of the future.

Just as you do, Ambassador Toon, I assess the work of our Commission as being useful. Although it would seem that no dramatic discoveries took place, we conducted our routine work, and I would once again emphasize that overall it was useful.

I would also like to make some specific remarks and proposals. The Russian Side would ask of you, Ambassador Toon, to keep us informed on what you find out. For example, you will be in Minsk, you were in Armenia, and there will be other information. I believe that this will be useful in terms of the general results of our work.

I also believe that we should explore a number of cases more deeply and concentrate our work on certain aspects. For instance, in the near future I would like to initiate a search for the burial site of Captain Dunham. I would like to ask General Krayushkin to oversee the search for documents regarding this matter and then, if necessary, we will organize a trip there for representatives of the Russian-American Commission. We shouldn't stop halfway.

I believe that General Krayushkin's proposal was correct in that we must realize, in a number of cases, specific appeals for assistance from the residents of specific localities. In particular, broadcasting material on a certain case over the radio--let's say in Murmansk--would be useful in finding sailors or fishermen who could help clear up that case. Perhaps we will have more than one 'Saiko' who could help us confirm many important historical facts.

As concerns our plans for future work, I believe we could do the following:

1) The Russian side of the Commission believes it necessary to continue our work for several more months because we are still not ready to prepare a concluding statement to report to our presidents. I believe that it would be proper because we must draw up a document; even if we disagree on certain issues, we will still be able to expound our point of view in writing. I think it would be proper to draw up a document when we conclude our work. I think that this work will take several more months.

2) Second, I think we must coordinate our work better. In this regard, I welcome direct contact between Colonel Parr, a person whom we respect, and the heads of the working groups. I think that he should meet weekly, not only with Lieutenant Colonel Osipov, but with me as well. Although we have met frequently in the past, I believe that we should also have weekly meetings.

3) Third, we believe that we should continue our work in those archives where we have never been and expand our work in several of the archives in which we have been; for example, the archives of the Border Troops. I will ask Colonel Mukhin, on the basis of the President's decision, to oversee approving access to the archives in Gatchina and Podolsk. If any problems arise, you should report to me immediately.

4) Fourth, though we didn't speak about this today, if the American side still wishes to go to Kolyma, Magadan, or another region this spring, then we must arrange for this trip. Therefore, we must know about your intentions in advance in order to prepare for this expedition.

I would once again like to voice our opinion on Mr. Kozyrev's statement. We do not pass any documents which have not been declassified. The declassification committee includes representatives from all interested agencies, including a representative from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We do not believe it necessary to receive someone else's permission concerning all of the declassified documents which we have at our disposal. Otherwise, the usefulness of the work of the Commission is put into doubt.

The Russian side is ready to send the Russian heads of the working groups to Washington. We will finalize the dates through normal working channels.

Finally, I agree with you, Ambassador Toon, that we can hold the next plenary session at the end of March or the beginning of April.

Now, since we have some time until the press conference, if you don't object we could listen to the specialist on camp and prison archives. We have here Mr. Mikhail Grigorevich Dymkov.

Toon: I think that would be a very good idea, but first I would like to answer a couple of questions which you put to me in your remarks. With regard to Magadan: Yes. We still would like to visit Magadan sometime in the spring. I can think of nothing that would enhance my reputation in the state of North Carolina than to know that I had spent some time in Magadan. Just as my meeting yesterday in the quarters of Mr. Beria and Mr. Andropov will also enhance my reputation.

Volkogonov: "You should have had your picture taken there.

Toon: Secondly, Mr. Chairman, on the next trip we'd also like to visit Kazakhstan because some of your colleagues in the working group sessions have recommended to us that this would be a fruitful place for us to visit. But we'll let you know far in advance of our intentions. Thank you again for a very useful session.

Volkogonov: Thank you. If you do not object then, since the hall for the press conference is not very large, at ten minutes to twelve I would like to invite the heads of the working groups, the Co-Chairmen of the Commission, and perhaps two or three other people. There will be a sufficient number of journalists and the Government Press Center is small. It goes without saying that we would like our esteemed congressmen and Mr. Pikhoya, the Chief Archivist of the Russian Federation, to participate in the press conference.

Now, I would like to ask Mr. Mikhail Grigorevich Dymkov to brief us on the nature and location of those archives. What kind of information do they contain? Please enlighten us on those camp and prison archives.

Dymkov: Distinguished Ambassador Toon, ladies and gentlemen. At the outset of my presentation, I would like to say that my whole career has been associated with those corrective labor camps as we used to call them, which were in fact prisons and camps. I began working in these facilities in 1962. It was at that time when the camps were being closed and the penal system was undergoing reform.

I started doing research work in the archives in 1985 when I came to the decision that I had to do research on the prison and camp system in Russia as a whole. In my research, I studied the prison system of Tsarist Russia, of the Provisional Government, and of various periods of the Soviet Union. I completed my research in 1990.

As far as what is of interest to the Commission, I would like to say my research shows that the corrective labor camp system of the Soviet Union was not suited for detaining foreigners. Apart from the camp system, there were other systems in the Soviet Union, so-called colonies and prisons. Camps were designed to detain large numbers of people. The camp guard was relatively minimal. Essentially, that duty was performed by the convicts themselves.

Now, a few words about the camp organization. The main unit was the camp station, which was headed by a convict in most cases. Virtually all the men under his authority were also convicts.

The prison system was something different. It provided for the strict isolation of convicts. I conducted my research in the Central State Archives of the October Revolution of the USSR. I dealt with both unclassified and classified materials. As far as the detainment of foreigners in places of confinement, I found no information.

In my work, I concentrated on the camp control and administration, and on the type of labor carried out by prisoners.

Volkogonov: Where do you think we can find material on foreigners? As you know, it's an established fact that some foreigners were detained, including Americans, in camps.

Dymkov: My guess is that you should study the archives of the Dubravnij [Dubrovlag ?] camp.

Volkogonov: What kind of archives are these? Are they state archives?

Lymkov: I didn't see these records in the state archives, so I would think that they are in the Interior Ministry archives or the archives of prisons.

Volkogonov: What kind of prisons?

Lymkov: The prison in Vladimir. Also, I believe, you must look carefully in the prison archives of the former KGB. I want to say that any archive holds a large number of material and I examined only a tiny fraction of these materials because I was pursuing a specific goal.

Volkogonov: Perhaps there are some questions?

Lymkov: I'd like to make a clarification. We've studied both the Dubravnij and the Vladimir prison archives and here we can conclude that there are no traces of Americans there. Also, I disagree with the statement that the corrective labor camps were not suited for foreigners because there are concrete facts that some 1000 Polish POWs had been kept in camps.

Lymkov: One more thing. We are pursuing the case of special camps which were established after 1945. The main purpose for these camps was to detain enemies of the people who had refused to lay down their arms.

Volkogonov: Ambassador Toon has a question.

Toon: You suggested that we might find some useful information in the former KGB archives? How do we get access to those?

Dymkov: It's hard for me to say for sure because I started my research when the records of the Central State Archives of the October Revolution had been declassified. At that time the two establishments--the NKVD and the Ministry for State Security--were merged. Before that, in the thirties, there were two kinds of camps there, so-called colonies which were under the Ministry of Justice and camps or prisons under the NKVD.

Volkogonov: Excuse me. Vladimir Petrovich, we are now going to the press conference and I ask that you sit here. Those who were invited to the press conference will now leave, otherwise the rest of you may stay here to continue this exchange of information.

[Volkogonov adjourns the meeting. Half of the group remains to listen to Mr. Dymkov, the other half leaves for the press conference.]